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 ABSTRACT 
This dissertation covers different aspects of political institutions and fiscal policy in local 
governments.  The first essay examines the political consequences of an increase in the district 
magnitude (the number of open seats) for legislatures.  The second essay studies how the size of 
a local legislature affects the size and composition of public spending.  The third essay develops 
and tests a theory of how transaction costs might affect the use of earmarked revenues by local 
budgeting authorities.  The last essay compares the relative impacts of factors that might make a 
local government more likely to adopt own-source revenues.  These questions are examined in 
the context of Brazilian and US local governments.  Individual chapter abstracts follow. 
Chapter 1: Research has consistently identified district magnitude as an important institutional 
factor in political competition.  The most familiar of these formulations is Duverger’s 
hypothesis, which argues that district magnitude affects the number of parties and legislative 
fragmentation among parties. Yet parties play little to no role in structuring political competition 
in some polities.  How might Duverger’s rule apply in the absence of meaningful parties?  Using 
the case of Brazilian municipalities, this paper estimates the influence of changes in district 
magnitude on alternative conceptions of political competition – the number of personalist 
political coalitions and opposition strength.  Results indicate that large changes in district 
magnitude had a positive but minimal effect on the number of coalitions in government.  The 
most consequential result of a larger district magnitude was a strengthened opposition, which 
increased its numbers.  Evidence from fieldwork suggests that larger city councils in Brazil may 
be more autonomous from the executive and engender a better check on executive power. 
Chapter 2. Many factors contribute to the size and composition of public spending.  Research 
that examines the role of legislature size has traditionally focused on political systems where the 
 legislature has budgeting authority, and higher expenditures emerge as a result of logrolling.  
This paper develops an alternate view of legislature size and expenditures for a political system 
where an independent executive holds the budgeting authority and must spend fiscal resources to 
maintain his or her legislative coalition. I examine the theory in the context of Brazilian 
municipalities.  Results indicate that larger legislatures led to higher public spending.  An 
average municipality that expanded from 10 to 15 legislators in 2013 spent 3% to 4% more than 
a similarly situated municipality that maintained 10 legislators.  This equals R$400k per year, or 
65 minimum wage jobs, per additional legislator.  There was an appreciable increase in urban 
infrastructure spending, while education expenditures did not change systematically in response 
to larger local councils.  The overall increase and the pattern of the increase are consistent with 
the notion that Brazilian mayors use public spending to build and maintain their legislative 
coalitions, and that they must appropriate more public funds to achieve these goals when the 
legislature is larger. 
Chapter 3. The question of whether earmarked public revenues are spent on their intended 
purpose has a long history in the academic literature. Theory suggests that earmarks should not 
matter since budget authorities can always shuffle money between accounts. However, empirical 
studies often find that much of marginal earmarked revenue is spent overwhelmingly on its 
intended purpose. There are many theories for this outcome, and this paper adds one more to the 
literature: transaction costs in the budgeting process.  When transaction costs are low, 
governments optimize between expenditure categories.  When the costs are high, the earmarked 
funds are spent exclusively on their intended purpose.  Further development of this theory 
suggests governments that are highly reliant on earmarked revenues will face unnecessary 
funding shortfalls in some spending categories, and will be more likely to pay the costs of re-
 allocating the revenues.  The theory is tested empirically using the case of Oklahoma counties 
and their management of the county highway fund from 1973 to 2012. Results are in line with 
the theory, suggesting that a moderate amount of earmarked revenues stimulate specific 
expenditures, but the effect diminishes as earmarks become a larger portion of the government’s 
total revenues. 
Chapter 4. There is increasing recognition among scholars that the fiscal link between citizens 
and their governments is an important contributor to more efficient allocation of public resources 
and a more accountable government.  However, many local governments in developing countries 
receive the majority of their funding from intergovernmental transfers, which severs that fiscal 
bond.  There are some cases in which local governments, despite large intergovernmental 
transfers, have chosen to increase their own taxes. Understanding why local governments choose 
to adopt new own-source revenues is an important step in the search for policies that encourage 
more local fiscal effort.  This paper examines this question in the context of a local lighting tax 
in Brazilian municipalities.  Results indicate that Brazilian municipal governments are willing to 
engage in the politically difficult work of taxing their citizens in times of revenue shortfall and 
service need, but that political calculations and the influence of nearby municipalities play a 
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1 CHAPTER 1: DISTRICT MAGNITUDE, POLITICAL 
COMPETITION AND OPPOSITION IN BRAZILIAN 
MUNICIPALITIES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have consistently found that the number of legislative seats in a district plays an 
important role in the nature of political competition.  Districts with more seats tend to have a 
higher number of parties in the legislature and more dispersion of power among political actors.  
The benefit of more parties is greater access to the political process for diverse social groups, 
which is often regarded as improved representation.  The drawback, however, is that it is more 
costly to negotiate legislation among more political groups.  This can take its toll on the ability to 
pass legislation and govern. 
The logic presented above began with the seminal work of (Duverger, 1963), and additional 
landmark contributions include (Rae, 1967; Cox, 1997), and (Powell, 2000).  Recent work has 
investigated the contextual factors involved in how district magnitude affects political 
competition (Moser & Scheiner, 2012).  This paper examines how district magnitude affects 
political competition when parties have only a minimal role in structuring politics.  Using the 
case of Brazilian municipalities, I argue that parties are not always the appropriate basis for 
political competition as conceived by Duvergerian electoral theory.  Instead, loose coalitions 
based on personal relationships, rather than party affiliation, is the appropriate unit of political 
competition in Brazilian Municipalities.  I show how changing district magnitude affects the 
political balance of personalist-coalitions in the legislature. 
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Cross-national studies of district magnitude and political outcomes face methodological 
challenges in establishing credible causal estimates. Comparisons across countries confront 
extensive heterogeneity in political systems, economic development, and social structure. It is 
exceedingly difficult to control for all these differences, especially given that the number of 
independent observations is limited.  Cross national panel studies that compare countries across 
multiple elections are unlikely to encounter the level of variation in political institutions over 
time that would be necessary to use fixed effects methods.  Some researchers have pursued a 
clever strategy of paired matching between upper and lower house elections (Moser & Scheiner, 
2012; Desposato, 2006), and others have advanced controversial instrumental variable arguments 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002).  One strategy in empirical political economy has been 
a turn to subnational studies, especially in federal systems (e.g. Putnam, 1994).  This option 
offers greater institutional homogeneity and potentially more observations.  Additionally, there 
are often institutional rules that facilitate empirical strategies to correct for policy endogeneity.  
This paper leverages the institutional homogeneity and exogenous policy change in Brazilian 
municipalities to produces credible estimates regarding the impact of district magnitude on 
political competition. 
I find that recent changes in district magnitude have important implications for the political 
structure of Brazilian legislatures.  Among the most important of these is that the increased 
district magnitude brought many more participants into the political process.  Political 
fragmentation as traditionally measured with respect to parties increased, but it was less 
pronounced with respect to electoral coalitions.  The influence of the opposition, however, 
increased.  While the percentage of the opposition in legislatures was not greatly affected, the 
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number of opposition legislators rose and this alone may have important implications for the 
independence of the legislature from the executive.  
This paper begins by considering how the concept of political competition is used in electoral 
theory and what alternative measures might look like in the absence of a strong party system. 
The second section introduces the Brazilian district-magnitude policy that this paper uses as its 
source of exogenous variation.  The paper then gives an overview of the mixed-methods 
approach that was used to generate and test theory. In the remaining sections, empirical results 
are presented for two separate outcome classes: How the policy of larger district magnitude 
affected political fragmentation and how it affected opposition strength. 
1.2 POLITICAL COMPETITION 
Competition for political power serves two purposes in a democracy.  It provides choice in an 
election so that an unsatisfied citizenry may replace its leader (Schumpeter, 2008).  Competition 
also serves an informational function so that society may be better informed (Mill, 1956), and 
elected officials may understand the mandates with which they are charged by the voters 
(Rousseau, 1968).  Even in the liberal view of democracy, where modern social choice theory 
sees mandates as incoherent, democratic competition plays an important informational role.  
Adopting a liberal conception of democracy, I discuss the role of competition in the context of 
modern electoral theory, and I explain why the use of alternative concepts of competition might 
sometimes be appropriate. 
1.2.1 Electoral Competition 
Competition provides voters with choice in an election.  The contours of this choice vary 
depending on which political divisions are salient within a society.  If the political divisions are 
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an expression of social cleavages like class, religion, region or the urban/rural divide, then 
candidates should emerge to offer solutions tailored to the preferences of these groups.  To the 
extent that these divisions are persistent over time, group leaders may invest in building 
organizations to promote the groups’ political interests.  These are political parties which are 
rooted in society.  Alternatively, political elites may develop parties purely for electoral purposes 
that find it convenient to foment social division in pursuit of voter support.  Regardless of how 
the parties came to be, they often reflect competing sets of social preferences, and political 
competition is structured based on parties. 
Electoral systems theory studies how electoral institutions influence who wins office.  To make 
empirical progress on this question, the notion of who is elected must be abstracted from the 
individual to a group level.  A natural system of grouping is based on political parties, which 
ostensibly represent discrete sets of social preferences.  Electoral systems scholars can then make 
statements about how electoral rules shape the aggregation and final distribution of the 
preferences, defined as a party, that win legislative seats1.   
In many countries, this is a sensible approach because parties are the natural unit of political 
competition.  In the extreme case of closed list proportional representation (PR) electoral 
systems, voters select parties to represent them, not individuals.  But even in less restrictive 
systems, the party is an important organizing force.  Parties solicit and redirect campaign 
financing to their members, and they use this money to maintain the loyalties of individual 
legislators to the overall party goals.  From the voter’s point of view, a party affiliation may 
reduce the costs of screening candidates (Aldrich, 1995).  Where voters trust that parties will 
                                                 
1 Landmark contributions include (Duverger, 1963), (Rae, 1967), (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989), (Cox, 1997), 
(Powell, 2000), and (Moser & Scheiner, 2012). 
 5 
 
screen and discipline their candidates, voters will align themselves with the party that most 
closely matches their preference.  Competition then becomes a game in which parties seek to 
convince marginal voting blocks to defect from their old party allegiance and to vote with their 
party.   
Empirical research on electoral systems theory has been productive where parties are the 
appropriate unit of political competition.  The number of parties can be used as a key outcome 
variable to understand the extent to which electoral institutions aggregate preferences (Powell, 
2000).  Proportional Representation (PR) systems provide a relatively low level of preference 
aggregation; many parties exist and are elected to the legislature. PR legislatures are highly 
representative of social preferences and the body is divided among a large number of preference 
groups (parties). This division is known as fractionalization (Rae, 1967; Lijphart, 1994), and 
bargaining costs to reach final legislation are high relative to less fragmented legislatures.  
Majoritarian electoral systems, on the other hand, provide a high level of preference aggregation, 
where only a few parties are elected to the legislature.  In single-member-district systems, often 
only two parties exist (Duverger, 1963).  As such, they have low level of preference 
fractionalization (low representation), and the costs of bargaining to arrive at final legislation are 
lower than that of PR systems (Powell, 2000).   
Parties are not always the most informative measurement of political competition.  Scholars  
have identified weak parties and weak party systems as an important feature of Latin American 
politics (Mainwaring, 1999; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999).  In these political systems, analysis of 
the electoral systems using number of parties as an outcome variable tells us less about the extent 
to which the political process is open to political groups.  The relevant political organizing 
principle in these countries is that of clientelistic networks of personal relations.  Electoral 
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coalitions are formed based on personal relationships and electoral math.  Politicians, who join 
forces with other politicians to compete in an election, win office and allocate state resources, 
such as public sector jobs and contracts, among their winning coalition.  Political competition is 
fierce, but party affiliation plays only a minor role in coalition and voter decisions.  In this 
context, to say that larger district magnitude leads to more parties in government says nothing 
about how electoral rules affect the preferences represented in government.  A more appropriate 
means to analyze the electoral system in terms of the extent to which electoral rules open the 
legislature to political groups, one should replace the number of parties with the number of 
coalitions as an outcome variable.   
1.2.2 Competition outside of Elections 
A common concern in the democratic accountability literature is that, “Where the election ends, 
tyranny begins (Madison, 1787, #53).” The fact that most modern democracies do not devolve 
into tyranny in non-election years has prompted contemporary scholars to search for the sources 
of democratic accountability.  Madison’s answer was that competent men of public spirit should 
be continually approved in frequent elections (Madison, 1787, #53).  Contemporary literature 
echoes this argument using the language of principle-agent theory.  Good agents are selected in 
the election process (prospective voting), and then their record is reviewed and approved or 
rejected in subsequent elections (retrospective voting) (Przeworski & Stokes, 1999).  The same 
view is apparently held by many legislators in Brazil, where one explained, “The first election is 
about what you say you’re going to do. The rest are about what you have done.”  In reality, it is 
never this clear.  Journalists write extensively about the past semi-public work of first-time 
candidates, and many incumbents with poor records have won elections based on their next-term 
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agenda2.  Nevertheless, it is sufficiently clear that if voters are to judge the fitness of their 
government for reelection, they need information on its performance.  Voters gather much of this 
information from their experiences.  Economic performance and public service quality are 
outcome variables that affect a voter’s evaluation of his or her government.  However, the voting 
decision will also benefit from information about the government’s activities and effort, not just 
outcomes.  Some outcomes are simply not observable to the general public.  For example, is the 
government conducting its public bidding in a proper manner?  Is the government investing 
sufficient resources in water transportation and storage?  Is the government following budgeting 
procedures?  Is it hiring based on competency or kin relations? 
Political competition is useful not only for providing choice during an election, but also in 
helping the public monitor and control their representatives outside of election periods.  Inter-
branch competition (checks and balances) provides monitoring and enforcement.  For example, 
the legislature supplies oversight to the executive branch, and can also take concrete steps to 
sanction other branches that encroach upon it.  Intra-legislative competition, on the other hand, 
may bring about both monitoring and enforcement, but enforcement against the executive branch 
will be scarce if the executive controls a majority of the legislature.  When the size of the 
legislative opposition falls below a set voting threshold, the opposition is powerless to take 
concrete actions against the majority.  Its best alternative, in this case, is to use its intimate 
knowledge of the legislative process and government activities to embarrass the government in a 
public forum.  For example, the key voting threshold in Brazilian Municipalities is 1/3.  Without 
possession of 1/3 of the legislative seats, the Majority in the legislature can pass any legislation it 
                                                 
2 The recent victory of Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff is an example of this.  She was the incumbent with a 
history of poor economic management.  In a change election, she ran on the platform of “more change,” and won the 
election based on her agenda, not her track record. 
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likes.  The opposition has no effective power.  As one majority councilor put it, “Without 1/3 
they can’t affect the functioning of the council. All they can do is complain.” 
Yet public complaints and theater from the opposition can play an important role in holding the 
government accountable.  When the opposition’s representation is below the critical voting level, 
adding even just a few more opposition legislators can change the debate through agitation, 
delays, and public pressure. 
1.2.3 Majority and Opposition Coalitions in Brazilian Municipalities 
The district magnitude can affect the strength of the opposition, which is the set of political 
groups that are outside of the government, looking in.  If multiple political groups are in the 
opposition, they will often unify to criticize the government in an attempt to eventually win back 
power.  Opposition promotes accountability. At times the opposition’s criticisms will be 
contrived and bombastic, but sometimes they will carry merit.  Through public discourse, the 
ambitious opposition raises questions to which the majority must respond if it is to maintain 
power in subsequent elections.  This is the manner in which competition generates information 
that is relevant to voter choice.  One Brazilian opposition councilor described his experience as 
follows: 
The mayor could run us over with a tractor. Anything he needs is going to pass, and pass quickly.  
His son is the President of the Legislature.  A cynic would say that we’re basically an extension of 
the mayor’s office.   
When there were 10 councilors, the mayor had 8 in his coalition.  Now there are 15 councilors 
and he has 11 or 12.  Before, he won with no problem.  Now, he wins at war.  Nobody likes to win 
at war, so he has been more hands off. 
Because we don’t have a majority, we only have two ways to put the mayor on the defensive  (1) 
Invite lots of people to the sessions, so then the majority has less courage to pass the mayor’s 
agenda.  (2) We don’t have access to the press, because they have contracts with the legislature 
and mayor’s office.  Social media is what saves us.  Me and [another opposition councilor] have 
the most weight on Facebook. That’s where we denounce the government.  
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It is clear that just adding one or two opposition councilors, even while remaining below the 1/3 
vote threshold, can pose challenges to the mayor’s legislative agenda.  In some cases, it might 
require more persuasion or fiscal resources to pass an important project.  A city councilor 
observed, 
The mayor needs to work harder to convince more people that something is a good project.  In the 
past, he just had to convince 7 city councilors, but now he needs to convince 9 councilors. 
An increase in opposition legislators also brings the chance that some of them might be fanatical, 
as in the case of this legislator who believes his sole purpose as a legislator is to investigate the 
mayor’s office: 
I am religious and I know I was put here for a reason.  I need to investigate and call out 
corruption in government.   
I have been denouncing several things since 2000.  In 2008 I made a denunciation and I was sued 
for R$ 500,000.  I had R$ 3 million in court cases against me and my newspaper when I decided 
the only way to change this was to enter politics.  I decided to become a candidate in May of 2012.  
I didn’t do any campaign strategy or planning.  I created a 4 page brochure on what I was going 
to investigate, and I distributed 10,000 of them. That was my entire campaign. 
I ended last year with 500 official data requests to the mayor.  This year, I have 400. I use my time 
to investigate and get answers.  I’m known as the councilor who investigates. Most of the tips 
come to me through my blog or Facebook, but some people even send me denunciations on 
WhatsApp. 
I walk with security yes, because I get threats for the stuff that I do.  For a while I had two 
bodyguards, and now I have just one. 
As important as opposition legislators might be for accountability, they are relatively uncommon.  
Without the mayor’s help, it can be an uphill battle for an opposition councilor to win reelection.  
The mayor is uncooperative with data requests from opposition legislators, and he may even be 
slow to respond to service requests from the opposition legislator’s constituents.  During the 
campaign, opponents paint the opposition legislator as somebody who cannot provide for the 
community: 
It’s good to be seen as a sponsor of a public works project.  If you’re in the opposition, that 
project is still going to happen.  But the Mayor won’t invite you to the inauguration and he’s 
going to praise another councilor at the ceremony.   
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Equally bad, an opposition legislator will not have access to public sector jobs for his political 
supporters: 
I was the mayor’s guy in the legislature, but then I started to grow politically.  The mayor felt 
threatened and so he retaliated.  I had the right to 8 appointed jobs in the mayor’s office, and then 
he took those jobs away from me.  
The payoff for majority members remaining loyal to the mayor is handsome.  Majority 
legislators have access to the mayor and the public resources that he or she controls.  These 
resources are an important leg-up when elections arrive.  However, the majority trades the ability 
to criticize the administration, and they are expected to defend it against the opposition and 
against angry citizens.  It can be painful for majority legislators to sit in session after session, 
bearing the brunt of the opposition’s criticisms, especially when they are warranted.  When the 
opposition consists of only one or two dissidents, it is easy to give them their turn to speak, and 
then move on with business.  But when the opposition is three or four people, the psychological 
stress of the criticism mounts.  Three or four opposition councilors can tie up debate and 
summon a vocal gallery and street protestors in a way that one or two councilors cannot.  The 
practical effect of the ability to generate a protest of critical mass means the mayor cannot rely 
on the legislative majority to vote with him every time the opposition is against his agenda.  The 
uncertainty associated with a stronger opposition means the mayor must be more discriminating 
in which legislative initiatives he promotes.  As a result, the legislature increases its 
independence from the executive. 
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1.3 POLICY BACKGROUND 
1.3.1 Government and Elections in Brazilian Municipalities 
Brazil has been independent for almost 200 years, but the current State, the 5th Republic, is only 
a quarter of a century old.  The Constitution was passed in 1988, and it determines the 
institutional order in all of Brazil.  Article 18 of the constitution establishes a federal structure 
where municipalities are considered to be autonomous federal units:   
Art. 18:  The political-administrative organization of the Federal Republic of Brazil is composed 
of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities3, all autonomous, in terms of 
this constitution.   
Article 30 lists the responsibilities of the municipalities to deliver local services and legislate on 
matters of local interest.  The largest expenditures of the municipalities in 2013 were Education, 
Health, Administration, and Infrastructure.  Article 29 outlines the essential characteristics of the 
municipality, including the size of the legislature: 
Art. 29:  The Municipality will rule itself through an Organic Law…ratified by two-
thirds of the municipal legislature in two separate votes, attending to the following 
principles:   
  I – Election of a Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and City Councilors, for terms of four years, 
through a direct election simultaneously realized across the entire country. 
  II – Election of the Mayor and Vice-Mayor up until 90 days before the end of the term 
of those whom they will succeed, following Article 77 [runoff required], if there are 
more than 200 thousand voters. 
  III – Inauguration of the Mayor and Vice-Mayor on the 1st of January in the year 
following the election. 
  IV – Number of City Councilors proportional to the population of the Municipality, 
observing the following limits 
a) A minimum of 9 and maximum of 21 in Municipalities with up to one million 
inhabitants 
b) A minimum of 30 and maximum of 41 in Municipalities with more than one 
million and less than five million inhabitants 
c) A minimum of 42 and a maximum of 55 in Municipalities with more than five 
million inhabitants. 
                                                 
3 Brazil has roughly 5,500 municipalities, each with a geographical extent comparable to that of U.S. Counties.  
Brazilian municipalities are typically composed of multiple urban centers surrounded by rural areas. 
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  V – Remuneration of the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and City Councilors fixed by the 
Municipal Legislature for the following legislature, observing the terms of [other 
constitutional articles]. 
 
In summary, the 1988 constitution defines municipalities as autonomous entities with significant 
responsibilities.  Their institutional structures are highly standardized with a Mayor and Vice-
Mayor who run on the same ticket, and a municipal legislature.  They are all subject to the same 
electoral rules under the control of the Electoral Court System, whose highest body is the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).  The fact that the electoral rules are outside the purview of 
local officials and applied in a rational manner offers a promising environment in which to study 
their effects. 
1.3.2 Federal Guidelines for Size of Municipal Legislature 
The number of municipal council seats has varied significantly over time from 2000 to 2012, 
with large change episodes occurring in 2004 and in 2012.  Figure 1-1 shows this pattern in 
Brazil’s 5,500 municipalities, as well as how the number of seats in each municipality are related 
to population.  The large changes are evident with municipalities losing seats between 2000 and 
2004, maintaining the same number of seats from 2004 to 2008, and then a large increase in seats 
in 2012.  These large fluctuations were the results of deliberate policy changes over the past 15 
years. 
Article 29 of the 1988 Constitution sets a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 21 city councilors 
for municipalities under 1 million inhabitants. It also, in a clause that would later generate much 
confusion and litigation, required that the number of councilors be in proportion to the 
population of the municipality.  The controversy emerged around whether the proportionality 
implied an arithmetic rule. 
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Throughout the 1990s and until 2002, “it was the TSE’s understanding that that Constitution did 
not establish arithmetic criteria for the calculation of the proportionality, leaving the 
Municipality with the autonomy to set it, as long as it complied with the limits in Article 29, part 
IV.4”  This approach resulted in a situation where the number of council seats bore little 
relationship to population.  Some municipalities had too few seats given their population (e.g. 
Sumaré with 13 seats for 168,000 people), and some municipalities had too many seats (e.g. São 
Manuel with 21 seats for 38,000 people).  This all changed in May 2004 with the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in the Mira Estrela case. 
Mira Estrela is a tiny municipality of three thousand inhabitants in the northwest of São Paulo 
state.  It had established the size of its city council at 11 seats through an Organic Law, using the 
procedure laid out by the constitution.  The choice of 11 seats was not well received by São 
Paulo’s Public Ministry5, who interpreted the law as unconstitutional.  It argued that such a small 
municipality should have nine seats to meet the “proportionality” standard in Art 29, Part IV of 
the constitution.  It sued Mira Estrela, and the case eventually ended up in the Supreme Court 
(STF).  The lead Justice assigned to the Mira Estrela case was Maurício Corrêa.  Justice Corrêa 
and the majority of his colleagues ruled that the concept of proportionality was “empty” without 
an established arithmetic rule, and they directed the TSE to implement one for the September 
2004 municipal elections.  In their decision, they defined a rule using the following reasoning: 
From the fact that municipalities with one million have 21 representatives, this implies one 
representative per 47,619 inhabitants.  But since the 1988 constitution requires at least 9 
                                                 
4 Page 378 of Recurso Extraordinário 197.917-8 São Paulo, Voto do Relator Ministro Maurício Corrêa 
5 The Public Ministry has no equivalent in the United States.  It is a Prosecutorial office with broad powers to bring 
civil cases against governments, corporations, and individuals as it sees fit with the end goal of defending the 
constitution.   
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representatives per municipality, apply this number to any municipalities with fewer than 47,619 
inhabitants, and add one more representative for each increment of 47,619 people.  This formula 
generates a piecewise representation profile that rises quickly to the maximum of 21, and then 
flattens out at 47,619 + (11*47,619) = 571,428 inhabitants until 1 million inhabitants.  
Municipalities above one million, of which there are fewer than ten, receive a slightly different 
treatment.  After 16 years of confusion, the Mira Estrela case finally established clear guidance 
on the number of seats in the municipal legislature.    
The practical result of the Mira Estrela case was a sizeable reduction in the number of city 
council seats from around 60,000 to 50,000 in the entire country.  Perhaps predictably, it also 
engendered angry responses from the political establishment.  Many politicians felt that their 
legislative powers had been usurped by an activist Supreme Court, and an amendment was 
immediately introduced to reestablish the number of municipal legislature seats.  The 
amendment took several years to work its way through the process and was finally ratified as the 
58th Amendment on Wednesday, September 23 of 2009.  While the impetus for the amendment 
was the Mira Estrela case and the issue of representation, Congress recognized that the public 
would not accept an increase in municipal legislature size without some kind of budgetary 
control.  Accordingly, the 58th Amendment contained articles that modified the number of 
municipal representatives in Art. 29 IV, as well as tightened the budgetary caps that had 
previously been specified in the Constitution (Art. 29-A.)   
The first article of the 58th amendment dramatically increased the maximum permissible number 
of representatives above what had been the Mira Estrela rule.  It specified the maximum number 
of representatives for 23 separate population segments, clarifying the relation between 
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population and representation.  The language for municipalities with up to 1,050,000 inhabitants 
was as follows: 
Art. 29, IV: For the Composition of Municipal Legislatures, the following limits will be observed: 
a) 9 councilors, in municipalities up until 15,000 inhabitants; 
b) 11 councilors, in municipalities of more than 15,000 and up until 30,000 inhabitants; 
c) 13 councilors, in municipalities of more than 30,000 and up until 50,000 inhabitants; 
d) 15 councilors, in municipalities of more than 50,000 and up until 80,000 inhabitants; 
e) 17 councilors, in municipalities of more than 80,000 and up until 120,000 inhabitants; 
f) 19 councilors, in municipalities of more than 120,000 and up until 160,000 inhabitants; 
g) 21 councilors, in municipalities of more than 160,000 and up until 300,000 inhabitants; 
h) 23 councilors, in municipalities of more than 300,000 and up until 450,000 inhabitants; 
i) 25 councilors, in municipalities of more than 450,000 and up until 600,000 inhabitants; 
j) 27 councilors, in municipalities of more than 600,000 and up until 750,000 inhabitants; 
k) 29 councilors, in municipalities of more than 750,000 and up until 900,000 inhabitants; 
l) 31 councilors, in municipalities of more than 900,000 and up until 1,500,000 inhabitants; 
 
Article 1 of the 58th Amendment, which permitted large changes in the size of the municipal 
legislature, entered into force with the 2012 municipal elections.  The change in legislature size 
was substantial for some municipalities.  For example, the municipality of Salto with 107 
thousand residents expanded its legislature from 11 councilors to 17 councilors in 2012.  This 
represents a greater than 50% increase in legislature size.  
1.4 METHODS OVERVIEW 
This paper uses an iterative mixed-methods approach (Lieberman, 2005) to understand the 
political effects of a change in district magnitude. I conducted an initial large-N analysis to 
uncover potential avenues of study and to inform case selection.  I selected municipalities and 
city councilors, their staff, and journalists to interview about their experiences with the decision 
to expand the legislature and with the seat increase.  I used semi-structured interviews to develop 
contextual knowledge and produce testable hypotheses about the impact the policy had on 
political competition.  Excerpts from these interviews are interspersed throughout this paper 
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because they present a rich illustration of politics in Brazilian municipalities and because they 
are direct descriptions from people who experienced an increase in district magnitude first-hand.     
The case selection proceeded primarily from the relationship between change in council size and 
change in the number of candidates running for office in São Paulo. Figure 1-2 shows how 
municipalities in the state of São Paulo experienced an increase in the number of candidates as 
they expanded their councils between the 2008 and 2012 elections.  The increase in candidates 
presents little surprise, since the electoral rules reward electoral coalitions that grow their 
candidate lists in proportion to the number of seats.  However, there is a large degree of variation 
in how the seat expansions affected the number of candidates.  Some municipalities added only a 
few candidates per seat, and some added as many as 50 new candidates per seat.  To discover 
what additional factors affect the number of candidates (and election dynamics in general), the 
case selection sought to choose municipalities that fit into one of four categories depending on 
whether the increase in candidates was expected given the change in number of seats and 
depending on the extent to which the municipality increased its legislature size.  Table 1.1 shows 
how the selected municipalities fit into the given selection criteria. The goal in examining cities 
where candidate increases were expected is to see the causal mechanism in action under 
“normal” circumstances.  Franco da Rocha and Salto experienced roughly average outcomes.  
Franco da Rocha added no seats and saw little change in the number of candidates from 2008.  
Salto added six seats and 150 new candidates, which is just above what would have been 
expected given a six seat increase.  The “off the line” cases of Itu, Arujá, and Barueri are 
intended as challenges to the notion that larger district magnitude brings about more candidates.  
In each of these cases, I paid close attention to competing factors that affected the number of 
candidates in the race.  I found that their “anomalous” behavior was due to mayoral political 
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competition.  Council candidate totals were reduced where the mayoral race was a lock for an 
incumbent mayor, and they increased where the mayoral race was particularly tight.  The nature 
of the race (i.e. incumbent or open) is clearly an important factor in candidate participation, 
which suggests it should also be included in any model that examines related outcomes such as 
number of parties or number of coalitions. Figure 1-3 shows the historical levels for number of 
seats and number of candidates for the past 3 elections.  One can verify, even from this small 
number of cases that there appears to be a relationship between number of seats (solid line) and 
the number of candidates, though at least one municipality (Arujá) bucks the trend and one 
municipality, Barueri, seems over-sensitive to the seat change.  Again, the missing factor that 
explains these trends were that Arujá had a particularly non-competitive mayoral election that 
year, while two well-known politicians ran for mayor in a hypercompetitive Barueri election. 
Case selection also necessarily faced a practical constraint, which was that the municipalities 
were within reasonable travel distance of São Paulo.  As such, the selected cases are all located 
within two hours of the city of São Paulo.  I conducted approximately 25 interviews with city 
councilors, staff members, and journalists across the five municipalities during the fall of 2014. 
1.5 POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION 
The electoral systems literature has traditionally focused on the number of parties as an 
important outcome of the electoral institutions.  This section shows how coalitions, not parties, 
are the appropriate grouping for political competition in the context of Brazilian municipalities.  
It also estimates the impact that a change in district magnitude has on the number of parties and 
on the number of mayoral coalitions. 
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1.5.1 Political Parties and Coalitions in Brazilian Municipalities 
The literature in Political Science has traditionally seen Brazil as having an especially weak party 
system (Mainwaring, 1999).  Over the past decade, scholarship on Brazilian Parties has noted 
substantial change.  At the national level, party voting discipline has steadily improved and party 
switching is less endemic.  Part of this strengthening at the national level is that parties have 
learned how to leverage the distribution of important electoral resources such as public campaign 
funds and advertising time to support candidates for national and state government.  
Furthermore, independent candidates are not allowed.  A candidate must be a member of a party 
to run for any public office.  The seat now technically belongs to the party (Brazilian 
Government, 1995), and parties are no longer required to automatically re-nominate their 
incumbent legislators.  Consequently, Brazilian parties have increasing control over who they 
present as candidates. 
The advances in strengthening the Brazilian Party System at the Federal and State levels have 
been less pronounced in municipal politics.  The same rules apply at the Federal and Municipal 
levels in that every candidate must be a member of a party and parties are the basic unit of 
competition defined in electoral law.  In practice, however, local politicians say that mayoral 
coalitions, rather than parties, compete.  In the words of one city councilor,  
The parties don’t have independence.  The Mayor has control over all the parties. Our Mayor has 
12 parties under his control.  If he wants to pull people out of the [legislative] opposition and 
increase his majority, he does the following:  He finds a councilor candidate that had good voting, 
but lost the last election.  He creates a new party for that councilor and puts 10 more people in 
that party to get votes and make it strong in the next election…He installs a party that doesn’t 
have a presence in town and he tells the state party, I’ll pay (e.g. $10,000 per month) to operate 
the party here. 
The municipality of Barueri increased the number of seats by seven in 2012, and the number of 
candidates jumped by four hundred.  The reasons for this show just how parties mean little 
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beyond a formal rule with which politicians must comply.  The precipitous increase in candidates 
happened in Barueri because,  
We used to have just one political group.  Then there was a divergence between two of the main 
leaders.  Gil Arantes put together a mega-group to run with him, and so Furlans had to do the 
same thing.  They started to say, “I need you in the dispute.”  This had very little to do with 
candidates just deciding to run on their own.  We ended up with more parties because we needed 
more boxes to hold all the new candidates.” 
The mayoral candidates provide the bulk of the campaign financing to their coalition’s council 
candidates.  One councilor pointed out that companies do not give money to councilors.  
Businesses donate to the campaign funds of the mayors, and then the mayors use that money to 
finance their “team” in the legislature.  Powerful rivals also mount mayoral campaigns with their 
own group of legislative candidates.  Political endorsements are traded within these coalitions.  
Figure 1-4 illustrates that it is uncommon for a party to remain outside of a mayoral coalition.  In 
over 3,000 of 5,500 municipalities in 2012, 100% of the parties joined a coalition.  In 4,000 
municipalities, over 90% of the parties were in a coalition.  In short, joining an electoral coalition 
is standard procedure for most local Brazilian parties. 
The party label is just as meaningless for new candidates, some of whom put surprisingly little 
thought into which parties to join. They understand that they must be in a party to run, but base 
their choices more on personal connections than ideological affinities.  I witnessed an exchange 
between the secretary of a party president and a prospective candidate who had arrived at the 
office to join a party:   
Man: I want to join the party. 
Party Secretary: Ok, but we can’t start taking registration until next year. I’ll call you in January 
if you leave your number. 
Man leaves his phone number, and begins to leave the office. 
Party Secretary: Oh, by the way, the party is PROS. 
Man: Sure, whatever. 
Me: Why did you come here to register instead of another office? 
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Man: I’ve seen this councilor around town and I like him. 
I asked other councilors why they joined their parties, and they often said it was through their 
network of friends.  Aside from PT councilors, most councilors regarded their parties as nothing 
more than a platform from which they ran for office.  
The claim that coalitions are the primary unit of political competition at the local level is not to 
deny that some local parties are reasonably independent.  Programmatic parties like the PT and 
PSOL are more responsive to party leadership, but even they face the cold, hard electoral math of 
electoral coalitions. 
I’m the President of the PT in this town…If the PT’s vote count falls in the next election, then we 
would be concerned about colligating with Sebastian [President of the PSCD party].  
Ideologically, he is the party of the opposition. But also – mathematically – he has 1700 votes.  
One wants to take advantage of the other, but since you don’t know exactly what is going to 
happen, you run the risk.  
We support the end of the electoral coalition, but meanwhile we are a political party.  PSOL won’t 
colligate for ideological reasons and they don’t get elected.  What is the point of that? The 
coalition distorts because you need to cooperate to get in, to not be out of the game, but two 
parties on opposite side gay marriage can be selected together.   
1.5.2 District Magnitude, Parties, and Coalitions in Brazilian Municipalities 
The number of seats in a district, the district magnitude, is an important institutional driver of the 
extent to which political rivals coordinate before or after an election.  The preceding discussion 
makes clear that electoral rivalry occurs at the level of coalitions and not parties. 
We should expect an increase in the district magnitude to increase the number of candidates and 
the number of parties in a municipality.  The number of candidates that a party or coalition is 
permitted to field is a proportional function of the number of seats, and parties benefit by having 
their lists as full as possible.  It is true that there is a minor tradeoff between the quality and 
quantity of council candidates, since low quality candidates might not be worth the coalition’s 
campaign funding.  These considerations, however, seemed to take a backseat to the evaluation 
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among councilors that more candidates contributing their votes to the coalition was a preferable 
strategy.  The immediate barrier to increasing the number of coalition candidates was the number 
of parties available to house these candidates.  Mayors often created new parties to install the 
additional candidates, which is why we should expect to see that the number of parties increase 
as do the number of council seats. 
Brazil’s electoral coalitions must formally register with the electoral authority, so it is possible to 
objectively define a coalition. Using the coalitions as the unit of political competition6, we 
should expect to see an increase in their numbers as the council size expands.  A change in the 
number of coalitions reflects changes in pre-electoral coordination.  If more political actors 
believe they have a chance to win office due to changes in electoral rules, then they will be less 
likely to join a big coalition. They might even go it alone, which would increase the number of 
coalitions.  A change in the number of coalitions that win seats, beyond the increase in all 
coalitions, reflects factors such as the electoral formula (mechanical effect) and voter 
coordination (voter psychological effect).  Research has found that voters have a difficult time 
voting strategically in districts with magnitudes greater than five seats (Cox, 1997).  It is unlikely 
that voters are able to coordinate in these races, so the electoral effect is likely to be a pure 
mechanical effect of the electoral formula allowing more coalitions into office. 
An increase in mayoral coalitions necessarily means an increase in the number of mayoral 
candidates.  One might wonder what effect the change in seats has on the competitiveness of the 
mayoral race.  Might more seats and more coalitions reduce the average vote share that wins 
                                                 
6 If a political party does not join a coalition, it counts as a coalition for measurement purposes. 
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mayoral races?  Might more candidates impede the ability of voters to coordinate their votes in a 
majoritarian election (Cox, 1997)? I test these considerations. 
1.5.3 Model & Data  
I estimate the effect of an increase in seats for several outcome variables, including for the 
number of parties, the number of parties winning a council seat, the number of coalitions, the 
number of coalitions winning a council seat, the number of candidates, the winning voteshare for 
the mayoral race, and the FS difference.   
The FS difference is a modification of Cox’s “FS ratio.”  It measures the difference in voteshare 
between the first and second loser of a majoritarian election, like the municipal mayoral race.  
An increasing FS difference is evidence that voters are strategically concentrating their votes in 
the top two candidates. 
Brazilian mayors may be elected to two consecutive terms, and incumbency is a powerful 
advantage in the elections.  Municipalities in which the mayor has experienced a good first term 
and is cruising to re-election will not engender as much competition.  One would expect fewer 
parties and fewer candidates to join the race.  The incumbency status may also be correlated with 
the probability that a municipality increase its council size.  For example, incumbent mayors 
might be less likely to support council size increases since they know larger councils will make 
their work more difficult in their second term.  Thus, an indicator is included to identify whether 
the election is one in which an incumbent is running. 
All outcome variables are modeled identically, relying on the difference between the 2008 and 
2012 elections for identification.  The OLS model is: 
      Outcomeit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Seatsit + 𝛽3Incumbentit + 𝛽4LogPopit + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it       (1) 
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The parameter of interest is 𝛽1, which estimates the effect of an increase in seats on the outcome 
variables.  While incumbency is included in the model primarily as a control, 𝛽3 is also 
intrinsically interesting.  It shows the effect that an incumbent election has on the level of 
political competition, as measured by the outcome variables. The log of population is included as 
a control variable.  Municipal fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖, are included to factor out slow moving factors 
like political culture, economic development, or regional tendencies.  A time fixed effect, 𝛿𝑡, 
controls for general trends between the 2008 and 2012 elections.  𝜖it is the unexplained 
component of the model.  In addition to an OLS estimation, the models are estimated using 2SLS 
to judge the robustness of the results.  The instrument for seats is the ceiling proscribed by 
federal legislation discussed above. 
      Outcomeit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Seats
^
it + 𝛼3Incumbentit + 𝛼3LogPopit + 𝜓𝑖 + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜈it       (2-A) 
The first stage is modeled using the seats instrumental variable and the other exogenous 
covariates that appear in equation 2-A.  
     Seatsit = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1SeatsIVit + 𝜋3Incumbentit + 𝜋3LogPopit + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜂it           (2-B) 
I obtained the data from Brazil’s Electoral Authority (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) do 
Brasil, 2015).  It was necessary to calculate the dependent variables and the indicator for an 
incumbent election, since this information is not provided directly by the TSE.   
1.5.4 Descriptive Statistics for Fragmentation Variables 
There are approximately 5,500 municipalities covered here.  Municipalities of greater than one 
million inhabitants are excluded because there are relatively few of them and the rules that 
determine their city council size are different than those under 1 million.  Brazil has many small 
municipalities, which is apparent in the size of the electorate and the population in Table 1.2.  
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The average population for municipalities under 1 million residents is about 27,000 residents in 
both years, and 15,000 of them voted for a mayoral candidate.  The average number of city 
council seats in 2008 was 9.27, and it increased to 10.25 in 2012.  On average this is a one seat 
increase per municipality, which is just over a 10% increase.  In practice, some municipalities 
increased their councils by a large amount (e.g. 40% or 50%), and others chose not to expand 
their councils at all.  The variation in this independent variable is visible in Figure 1-1. 
Table 1.2 is useful to obtain a baseline understanding of the outcome variables.  For example, the 
average municipality has approximately 10-12 political parties, and about half of those parties 
are elected to the city council.  There are fewer coalitions, as would be expected.  The average 
municipality has just over 3 coalitions, which means they have approximately 3 mayoral 
candidates in a municipal election.  On average, 2.5 of those coalitions win seats in the 
legislature.  A high proportion of the elections are ones in which the incumbent mayor is 
running.  In 2008, 57% of the elections were incumbent races, while that number was 44% in 
2012.  The incumbent certainly is advantaged, but he or she does lose.  In 2012, the incumbent 
won 38% of the elections, and in 2012 the incumbent won 24% of the elections compared to the 
44% of the elections in which the incumbent ran. 
The average winning vote share for mayor was around 56% - 57%, with a standard deviation of 
around 13 percentage points.  This highlights the fact that many mayors win office with less than 
(and sometimes significantly less than) the majority of the votes.  In other municipalities, 
mayoral candidates win with 80% - 100% of the vote.  The average difference in vote shares 
between the first losing mayor (second place) and the second losing mayor (third place), is 
substantial. The FS Share difference is around 24 percentage points, which means that on 
average, the third placed mayoral candidate does not come close to being competitive. 
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The number of council candidates running in the 2012 election increased dramatically.  In 2008, 
the average municipality (with 27,000 people) had 56 city council candidates.  By 2012, there 
were 73 candidates for councilor, a 30% increase.  On a per seat basis, however, the number of 
candidates rose only moderately, from 5.8 candidates per seat in 2008 to 6.6 candidates per seat 
in 2012. 
1.5.5 Multivariate Results for Fragmentation Outcomes 
Four model specifications are estimated for the outcome variables.  The baseline estimate is OLS 
without the regression controls of population or incumbent election in equation (1).  The second 
specification is the OLS estimate with the population and incumbent election controls in 
equation (1).  The third estimate is the 2SLS from equations (2) without the controls, and the 
fourth estimate is the 2SLS from equations (2) with the population and incumbent controls. 
Table 1.3 arranges these estimates into columns.  Cells contain the estimates of the effect of a 
change in one seat on each of the outcome variables.   
A series of rows at the bottom of Table 1.3 show how the model specifications are different.  
Estimates (1) and (3) do not use controls beyond municipal and year fixed effects.  Estimates (3) 
and (4) replace the number of seats with a predicted number of seats given the federal ceiling.  
The estimates are relatively stable across several specifications that are quite different.  
Furthermore, the model has enough precision to say that the estimates of seats on party and 
coalition formation are statistically different from zero. 
The model estimates an increase in the number of parties by 0.25 for each additional seat.  
Municipalities that added four seats could therefore expect one additional party to be created.  
The model estimates an increase in the number of parties that win a seat by approximately 0.4 
per additional seat.  Thus, municipalities that expanded their legislature size by two or three seats 
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could expect another party to be elected.  Of course, the discussion above suggests that these 
parties are not meaningful in the sense that they don’t introduce new representation into the 
legislature. 
The effect of the seat increases on the number of coalitions in a municipality is positive but 
minimal.  The estimates suggest that 0.10 coalitions are formed as a result of an additional seat.  
Thus, a municipality would have to add ten seats in order to expect an additional coalition to be 
formed in the municipality.  The number of seats necessary to elect a new coalition to the 
legislature is only marginally different.  Given that the estimate is 0.15 new coalitions in the 
legislature per seat, a municipality would have to increase its legislature by six or seven seats in 
order to bring a new mayoral coalition into the legislature.  While these estimates are not 
practically large, they are interesting in that they show that there is less pre-electoral 
coordination among coalitions when there are more legislative seats available.   
The estimates suggest that the increase in the number of seats did not significantly influence the 
voteshare with which the mayor won the election.  The signs of the estimates are generally 
negative, but they are also very close to zero, practically speaking.  The three negative estimates 
are generally around one tenth of one percentage point per seat.  Assuming these estimates are 
correct, even the addition of five seats would only reduce the winning voteshare by 0.5 
percentage points. 
Overall, the estimates show that the increase in the number of seats had the effect in the 
generally expected direction, but that these effects are not particularly large.  This is somewhat 
expected, given that the district magnitude was already quite high (10 – 15) for these 
municipalities.  However, if we consider opposition rather than fragmentation as an outcome 




Brazil’s system of government is often referred to as Parliamentary Presidentialism.  This applies 
at all levels of government, from the federal government, to the states, and in the municipalities.  
While the executive is elected independently of the legislature, he or she has the responsibility of 
constructing a legislative coalition to pursue an agenda.  Academics originally expected this 
arrangement to create political deadlock (Ames, 2001), but Brazilian executives have been 
generally successful in passing their policy agendas (Melo & Pereira, 2013).  The executive is 
able to offer public sector jobs, pork-barrel spending, and even campaign funds to prospective 
members of the majority in exchange for their legislative support.  The unequal relationship 
between the executive and the legislature in municipalities means that democratic accountability 
has taken on a distinct parliamentary style.  The shift to larger legislatures in the municipalities 
has the potential to change the accountability style from one of parliamentarism to something 
closer resembling presidentialism.   
Parliamentary accountability is characterized by a narrower chain of delegation from the voter to 
the government’s activities (Strøm, 2000).  The voters hold the ruling party or coalition 
responsible because they know that the opposition has limited opportunity to interfere or obstruct 
the ruler’s policies.  Presidential-style accountability, on the other hand, builds additional 
conflict into the institutional arrangement in order to increase competition and offer meaningful 
opportunities for the opposition to have their concerns heard and addressed.   
Strøm points out that parliamentary accountability relies heavily on ex-ante selection of “good” 
politicians, since it is limited in its ability to generate meaningful ex-post monitoring and 
enforcement (Strøm, 2000).  Parliamentary democracies typically achieve acceptable screening 
of candidates through their parties, which are well positioned enough to deny unacceptable 
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candidates a chance at office.  In Brazil, however, there is a parliamentary accountability model 
(weak ex-post accountability) without strong ex-ante screening of candidates because politicians 
select their parties, not the other way around.  This is a recipe for weak democratic 
accountability. 
Policies that strengthen the legislative opposition will lead to better ex-post monitoring and 
potentially even additional enforcement.  A stronger opposition improves intra-legislative 
monitoring, where opposition legislators hold majority legislators to account.  It also improves 
the independence of the legislature, which is supposed to provide oversight over executive 
operations. 
There are two ways in which the legislative opposition can improve its strength.  It can improve 
its proportion, so that it controls a larger voting weight.  There are three key thresholds, where an 
opposition with greater than 33% but less than 51% is in a position to block some legislation.  
An opposition share of 51% to 66% marks a minority government, and an opposition share of 
greater than 66% defines a super-minority government. 
The opposition can also gain strength independently of how its voteshare changes.  Even when 
voteshare stays constant or falls, additional opposition legislatures introduce an enhanced 
capacity to wage successful public relations campaigns against the majority.  A larger group of 
opposition legislators, regardless of whether they attain a formal voting threshold, eventually 
reaches a critical mass where they can complicate parliamentary procedure and facilitate enough 
meaningful public protest to draw unwanted attention to the majority’s actions. 
It is not clear that a larger legislature would necessarily increase the proportion of opposition 
legislators elected to office, but one would expect that it should increase the number of 
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opposition legislators.  There is at least anecdotal evidence that stronger oppositions, even if only 
in numerical but not proportional terms, encourage greater legislative independence.  The effects 
of an increase in seats on opposition, measured both in numerical and proportional terms, are 
estimated in the next section. 
1.6.1 Descriptive Statistics for Opposition Variables 
The means and standard deviations for the key variables used in the opposition analysis appear in 
Table 1.4.  Some of these variables are repeated from Table 1.2, like the seats, population, and 
proportion of elections with an incumbent.  There are two new variables related to the strength of 
the opposition: the number of opposition legislators and the percent of the seats in the legislature 
that is occupied by opposition politicians.  The table shows that there are typically three or four 
opposition legislators, which amounts to around 30% to 40% of the total seats.  Remembering 
that 33% is the magic number with which the opposition can begin to impede the mayor’s 
legislative agenda, we see the stakes of adding or subtracting just one opposition legislator.  For 
many municipalities, just one more opposition legislator would be enough to change the formal 
relationship of the mayor with the legislature.   
1.6.2 Multivariate Results for Opposition Variables 
The estimates from equations (1) and (2), using the opposition variables as the outcome, are 
listed in Table 1.5.  Opposition increases by between 0.4 and 0.5 legislators for an additional 
seat.  Alternatively stated, a municipality that increases its legislature by two or three seats 
should expect one additional opposition councilor.   
The percentage of councilors in the opposition does not change much as a result of the larger 
councils.  The estimates are all less than an additional 1 percentage point increase per seat, and 
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three of the four estimates are not statistically different from zero.  The instrumented models 
appear to make a sizeable difference in the estimates of percentage opposition. Using the 
estimate of 0.5 percentage point increase per seat, a municipality with an increase of five seats 
would only expand their opposition voteshare by 2.5 percentage points.  This might be enough to 
take them over a threshold, but the effect will be important for only the most marginal elections. 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
The number of legislative seats in a district is an important institutional factor in political 
competition.  Most scholar studies have used the number of political parties as an outcome 
variable, yet parties play little to no role in structuring political competition in some polities.  
This paper examines the effect of a change in district magnitude on alternative conceptions of 
political competition in Brazilian municipalities, including the number of coalitions and the size 
of the opposition.  Results show that the change in district magnitude has a significant impact on 
the number of parties, but that the impact is only moderate with respect to the number of 
coalitions, which is the more relevant outcome variable for competition in Brazilian 
municipalities.  The increase in district magnitude also increases the number of opposition 
legislators, albeit not necessarily their proportion.  There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that a 
greater number of opposition councilors, even if they do not have increased voting power, may 
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Figure 1-3: Trends for Number of Seats and Candidates in Selected Municipalities 
 
 






Selected Municipalities for Interviews 
 Candidate Increase 
Expected 
Candidate Increase Not 
Expected 
No Seat Increase Franco da Rocha Itu 
Large Seat Increase Salto Arujá, Barueri 
Table 1.1: Selected Municipalities & Case Selection Criteria 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Fragmentation Variables 
 2008 2012  
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Notes 
Size of Electorate 14970 33069 15150 32141 Votes for Mayor 
Seats 9.27 1.16 10.24 2.42 Number of Seats 
Population 27.2 64.3 27.3 62.4 1000s of people 
Number of Candidates 56.12 44.28 73.35 66.44  
Number of Coalitions 3.32 1.48 3.22 1.50  
Number of Coalitions 
with Seats 
2.63 0.90 2.62 0.96  
Number of Parties 10.94 4.80 12.64 5.33  
Number of Parties with 
Seats 
5.59 1.54 6.40 2.00  
Incumbent Mayor 
Election 
0.57 0.49 0.44 0.50 Yes/No 
Incumbent Mayor Won 
Election 
0.38 0.49 0.24 0.43 Yes/No 
Number of Candidates 
Per Seat 
5.82 3.44 6.62 3.83  
Winning Vote Share 57.08 13.80 56.08 12.92 Voteshare of winning 
Mayor Candidate 
FS Share Difference 24.48 14.56 24.80 14.83 Mayor Race: First to 
Second Loser Voteshare  
Number of Observations 5495  5501   
*Brazilian Municipalities with fewer than 1M population 





Summary of Effects of Seats on Outcome Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Parties 0.227*** 0.215*** 0.272*** 0.255*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of Parties with a Seat 0.416*** 0.412*** 0.430*** 0.425*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Mayoral Coalitions 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.112*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Number of Mayoral Coalitions 
with a Legislative Seat 
0.145*** 0.147*** 0.152*** 0.156*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Mayoral Candidates 
per Legislative Seat 
-0.030 0.131*** -0.034 0.133*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Winning Mayoral Voteshare -0.016 0.030 -0.128 -0.078 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) 
FS Share Difference -0.099 -0.121 -0.270 -0.320 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.31) (0.31) 
Municipal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seats Instrumental Variable No No Yes Yes 
Population & Incumbent 
Controls 
No Yes No Yes 
Number of Municipalities 5498 5498 5498 5498 
Population BR Munis < 1M residents in 2008 & 2012 
Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates 
significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level have three stars *** 




Descriptive Statistics for Opposition Variables 
 2008 2012  
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Notes 
Seats 9.27 1.16 10.24 2.42 Number of Seats 
Population 27.2 64.3 27.3 62.4 1000s of people 
Incumbent Mayor Election 0.57 0.49 0.44 0.50 Yes/No 
Number of Opposition 
Legislators 
3.38 1.90 4.26 2.26  
Percentage of Opposition 
Legislators 
36.52 19.97 41.51 18.90  
Number of Observations 5495  5501   
*Brazilian Municipalities with fewer than 1M population 
Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics for Opposition Variables 
 
Summary of Effects of Seats on Opposition Outcome Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Opposition Legislators 0.441*** 0.436*** 0.489*** 0.484*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Percent Opposition Legislators 0.155 0.096 0.510** 0.455* 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.26) 
Municipal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seats Instrumental Variable No No Yes Yes 
Population & Incumbent Controls No Yes No Yes 
Number of Municipalities 5498 5498 5498 5498 
Population BR Munis < 1M residents in 2008 & 2012 
Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates significantly different from zero at 
the 99% confidence level have three stars *** 
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2 CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATURE SIZE AND PUBLIC SPENDING IN 
BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The determinants of public spending levels and composition have long been the subject of 
political and economic inquiry.  Early research revolved around collective choice and recent 
literature focuses on the role that political institutions play in shaping expenditures.  A strand of 
this work examines the importance of legislature size, particularly in political systems where the 
legislature has fiscal primacy.  I seek to develop and test a theory of how the legislature size 
affects public spending in political systems where the president has principal budgeting authority 
and must build a legislative coalition.  I do so using the case of Brazilian municipalities. 
This paper also serves as a policy evaluation.  The recent increase in city council size is a topic 
of controversy in Brazil, and academic work is underway to identify the effects of the policy.  
This paper examines how it affected Brazilian municipal public spending, not only in magnitude, 
but also in composition.  Results indicate that larger legislatures led to higher public spending.  
An average municipality that expanded from 10 to 15 legislators in 2013 spent 3% to 4% more 
than a similarly situated municipality that maintained 10 legislators.  This equals R$ 400k per 
year, or 65 minimum wage jobs, per additional legislator.  There was an appreciable increase in 
urban infrastructure spending, while education expenditures did not change systematically in 
response to larger local councils.  The overall increase and the pattern of the increase are 
consistent with the notion that Brazilian mayors use public spending to build and maintain their 
legislative coalitions, and that they must appropriate more public funds to achieve these goals 
when the legislature is larger. 
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2.2 PUBLIC SPENDING LITERATURE 
Scholars have found that many factors, beyond legislature size, contribute to public spending 
magnitude and composition.  Any empirical study of the relationship between council size and 
spending must consider these theoretical factors and provide a convincing rationale for how the 
research design excludes them from the causal effect attributed to council size.  I discuss the 
general determinants of public expenditures before moving onto the role that political institutions 
and legislature size play in the size and composition of spending. 
2.2.1 General Determinants of Public Expenditures 
The seminal work on public goods expenditures was Paul Samuelson’s a normative theory of 
public expenditures (Samuelson, 1954)7.  He poses the optimal conditions for public sector 
expenditure level and composition.  He notes that while it might be theoretically possible to 
solve his model for optimal public expenditures, it is not practically feasible for two reasons.  
First, the model requires information about the costs and benefits of public and private services.  
The problem that arises is that public sector benefits are unknown and cannot be easily 
discovered. Residents will underreport how much they expect to benefit from a new public 
service, lest costs end up allocated based on their reported benefits.  Second, even if residents 
sincerely disclosed their benefits from public sector goods, this information would only be 
enough to calculate a Pareto-efficient frontier for production and consumption.  In order to 
determine a single best outcome, Samuelson’s model requires a social welfare function to 
determine the optimal level and composition of public spending. 
                                                 
7 A review of the public expenditure literature is provided in (Shelton, 2007) 
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Importantly, the Samuelson model views public expenditures as resulting from the interaction 
between supply factors and collective demand.  It is useful to organize our consideration of the 
determinants of public expenditures around this supply and demand framework.  Some research 
has focused on the role that public sector efficiency and prices play in expenditures.  The most 
well-known of these is the Cost-Disease theory by (Baumol & Bowen, 1967), where the authors 
suggest that rising costs of public services supposedly outpace the costs of private services.  
Other authors have suggested the importance in accounting for the level of difficulty of 
supplying public sector services in a given environment (Bradford, Malt, & Oates, 1969) and in 
the management efficiency of the public sector organization (Duncombe & Yinger, 2011).      
The demand for public sector goods, however, has dominated the political economy literature.  
Scholars have sought to understand the underlying factors that determine the benefit people 
receive from consuming public goods.  Two factors are mainstays in calculating the demand for 
a (public) good. They are income and population size (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973).  Richer 
countries tend to spend more money on public services, per capita.  One longstanding theory, 
Wagner’s Law, supplies a mechanical rational for this observation. The theory suggests that the 
income elasticity of demand is elastic for public services – perhaps because people only begin to 
value public goods after their basic needs are met.  If this were true, then the demand for public 
goods would rise disproportionately faster than the demand for private goods as a society 
increases its wealth.  There is also some evidence that public expenditures per capita decrease as 
population rises (Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998).  The theory suggests that larger populations might 
be able to take advantage of scale economies in public services, but also that larger communities 
will tend to be more heterogeneous preferences and their ability to settle on a common set of 
public services could be inhibited for this reason. 
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Economic inequality may also drive demand for public services.  In countries where tax-payers 
often pay different amounts based on their income levels but receive the same level of services, 
poorer residents face a lower “tax-price” for public goods and thus demand more public 
expenditures.  This tax-price mechanism was put to work by (Meltzer & Richard, 1981) to show 
how greater inequality can lead to larger public expenditures in a democracy. 
The notion that heterogeneous communities would have a lower demand for public services is 
prevalent in the literature because reduced expenditures where there is ethnic fragmentation is 
observed in the data with great regularity.  Among the suggested reasons for this pattern are 
demand-side explanations such as preference heterogeneity and disutility of sharing public goods 
with outsiders (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999).  Other work on the role of ethnic 
fragmentation in the provision of public goods has suggested there might be a supply-side effect, 
where fragmentation inhibits the efficiency of provision (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & 
Weinstein, 2007). 
Samuelson’s model shows that even if we understood all the relevant supply and collective 
demand factors, the optimal public spending level and composition would not be obvious, since a 
social welfare function is not available.  Another method must be used to determine the final 
spending level and composition.  In a democracy, the principal method of collective decision-
making is an election.  Academic work has repeatedly found that changing electoral rules can 
generate different electoral outcomes from the same underlying voter preferences8.  It is not a far 
reach to suppose that electoral rules and other political institutions might also affect public 
spending.  In fact, scholars have found that proportional representation (PR) electoral rules 
                                                 
8 See (Riker, 1982) for a review of the literature beginning with Condorcet. 
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generate higher levels of public spending (as transfers) than majoritarian electoral rules (Milesi-
Ferretti, Perotti, & Rostagno, 2002) (Persson & Tabellini, 2004)9.  The underlying logic here 
appears to be that politicians in majoritarian systems are motivated to bring home local public 
services, whereas politicians in proportional systems are rewarded for finding creative ways to 
transfer resources to their constituent groups.  Presidential systems often spend less than 
parliamentary systems because the president is a separate line of accountability representing all 
voters and therefore internalizing the full costs of public spending10.  Similarly, nationalized 
politics (national parties, unitary government) appear to create fewer pressures for public 
spending because public resources are less necessary to gain the support of local politicians 
(Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2008). 
A substantial literature has also developed regarding “political business cycles,” where public 
spending rises and falls in line with scheduled elections.  The literature initially focused on the 
incentives of government officials to stimulate the economy using monetary policy ahead of an 
election goals (Hibbs, 1977; Nordhaus, 1975), but scholars quickly broadened the inquiry to how 
incumbents use fiscal policy to achieve electoral (Drazen, 2001). The general argument is that 
when conditions permit, incumbents will use monetary or fiscal policy immediately before an 
election to stimulate the economy and then will adopt tighter policies after they are elected.  The 
Political Business Cycle (PBC) theory has been applied to local governments as well, 
concentrating on their fiscal policy ahead of elections. There is anecdotal and statistical support 
for the theory at the municipal level, though the severity of it depends on several factors 
                                                 
9 Samuelson’s framework is primarily directed at the collective purchase of public goods, and not at transfers 
between political groups. The coercive nature of political institutions means that authors who focus on them as 
factors in public spending may also theorize about transfers.  This is important because they are a growing part of 
public spending with the rise of the welfare state. 
10 See (Eslava, 2011) for a survey of the causes of fiscal deficits, which are situations where revenues and 
expenditures fail to balance. 
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including institutional controls and fiscal transparency (Khemani, 2004; Sakurai & Menezes-
Filho, 2010). 
2.2.2 Legislature Size and Public Expenditures 
Another political institution that appears to affect public spending is the size of a legislature.  
The literature on legislature size and public spending draws on a theory of logrolling that was 
formalized in a paper by Barry Weingast in 1981 (Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981), where 
spending increases in proportion to 1/n, with n equal to the number of legislators. The intuition 
behind this model is a “tragedy of the budget commons,” where the spending benefits accrue to 
legislators’ districts, but the costs are spread over the entire country.  The Weingast paradigm is 
appropriate for the single-member-district (SMD) characteristic of the United States’ electoral 
system, where there are a large number of districts and only one representative per district.  In 
this model political bargaining is between districts.  However, the political reality in many other 
countries is one of multi-member districts, where the members serve as the political 
representation of diverse social groups.  Political conflict is then no longer between districts, but 
rather between coalitions, and it can be expensive to hold them together into a governing 
coalition. Public spending is therefore an indispensable resource to the government for 
legislative support, and various works have found that spending is higher in Proportional 
Representation (PR) than SMD electoral systems (Persson & Tabellini, 2002).  There have been 
various attempts to replace districts with coalitions in the Weingast model and to examine the 
empirical relationship between government fragmentation and expenditures under the political 
logic of coalition government.  This literature was initiated as cross-national studies that 
observed higher spending for more fragmented governing coalitions (Roubini & Sachs, 1989) 
(Scartascini & Crain, 2002) (Bawn & Rosenbluth, 2006).  More recent sub-national studies, 
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aimed at addressing methodological concerns with the cross-national studies, find similar results 
(Baskaran, 2013). 
The relationship between legislature size and public spending has taken on a distinctly sub-
national orientation in the empirical literature.  Early empirical work tested the theory in US 
States (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 2001) and US cities (MacDonald, 2008).  More recent studies, 
keeping with a general trend in the academic literature, have pursued better research designs to 
eliminate potential institutional endogeneity (Egger & Koethenbuerger, 2010; Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2012).  There are two causes for concern that a correlational relationship between 
legislature size and public spending are not necessarily causal.  First is a reverse-causality story, 
where polities with larger public sectors expand their legislatures in response to high public 
spending.  The optimistic version of this argument is that legislatures expand in order to provide 
proper oversight (and perhaps lower spending).  The cynical version is that legislatures expand 
so that more of the political elite may extract benefits from society.  If the benefits are limited 
only to higher spending in the legislature, then the causal effect of larger legislatures on overall 
public spending should be minimal.  If, however, the new councilors are able to expand 
government outlays, then legislature size would have causal force with respect to public 
spending.   
The second potentially confounding relationship could be that social or economic factors cause 
voters to have a preference for both a large public sector and a larger legislature.  This is a more 
difficult argument to make on its face, since the main argument to have a larger legislature is to 
accommodate social heterogeneity.  However, social heterogeneity is generally thought to be a 
factor in reducing public spending (Alesina et al., 1999) (Habyarimana et al., 2007), so one 
would expect size of the legislature and public spending to move in opposite directions. 
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In summary, the total level of public spending is influenced by many factors.  As Samuelson and 
subsequent research has shown, we observe spending outcomes that are determined by more than 
just the supply and demand for collective purchases.  We experience outcomes whereby the 
supply and demand factors that have been filtered through political institutions.  The remainder 
of this paper focuses on how one of these institutions, legislature size, affects public spending in 
a specific political context. 
2.3 LEGISLATURE SIZE AND SPENDING IN BRAZIL 
Previous research that focuses on public spending as function of legislature size does not quite fit 
with the Brazilian experience.  This is because in Brazil the ultimate budget authority rests with 
the executive, rather than with the legislature or parliament.  While the legislative branch in local 
and national Brazilian governments formally approves a budget plan for each year, the executive 
makes all appropriation decisions.  If he or she refuses to release funds for a particular budgeted 
item, then the spending simply does not occur.  In this context, the logrolling paradigm pioneered 
by Weingast cannot provide the reason for why larger legislatures might lead to higher spending 
since the final appropriation decisions are made by the executive, who is accountable to all 
districts.  Nor are the coalition adaptations of Weingast’s theory a useful guide to the Brazilian 
experience (Bawn & Rosenbluth, 2006), since these theories assume that spending decisions are 
made in the legislature by parties behaving in an essentially logrolling-type way. 
The connection between legislature size and public spending is different in Brazil because it is 
driven by the co-dependence of the executive and legislative branches.  Brazil’s political 
institutions are often described as “Presidential Parliamentarism,” since the executive is 
independently elected and must build an electoral coalition of city councilors to carry out his 
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legislative agenda.  Without 67% of the legislators regularly voting with him, the executive can 
expect opposition councilors to stymie his legislative agenda.  City council elections are not 
cheap in Brazil, so legislators pursue all advantages. They seek public sector jobs to reward 
political operatives who supported them in the election, and they angle for public works projects 
to burnish their reputation as a champion of the people.  Since the mayor controls both jobs and 
budget appropriations, he or she can credibly offer them in exchange for the legislators’ support. 
In the context of Brazilian Presidential Parliamentarism, one might speak of a market for votes in 
the legislature.  The executive demands voting support for his or her agenda and pays for votes 
with budget appropriations destined to legislators projects11.  Legislators supply voting support 
in exchange for the appropriations.  This observation serves as the basis of the theoretical model 
presented below. 
Brazilian municipalities have been used to analyze a wide variety of political-economy problems 
due to their broadly available data, high count, (formally) homogenous political institutions, and 
a plethora of federal legislation that facilitates convenient statistical identification of policy 
effects.  Some of the more well-known work has investigated the response of voters to 
information about corrupt politicians (Ferraz & Finan, 2008) and the political resource curse 
(Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini, 2010). 
Brazilian municipal legislatures have undergone profound changes in recent years.  Between 
2000 and 2013, many of the country’s approximately 5,500 councils have seen the number of 
seats reduced and then increased by as much as 40% - 50%.  For some of the larger 
municipalities, it was not uncommon to experience a fluctuation from 17 seats to 13 seats, and 
                                                 
11 The Mensalão scandal, discovered in 2005, was an example where the executive dispensed with indirect 
payment of legislators and instead offered cash for votes. 
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then finally back to 17 seats within the course of 8 years.  This provides substantial temporal 
variation that is an excellent starting point for estimating the impacts of city council size. 
The dynamic between the executive and the legislative branch is comparable between the 
Brazilian federal and municipal governments.  In both cases, the executive is elected by 
majoritarian vote, and the legislature is elected by open-list proportional representation.  This 
creates a situation at all levels of government where an independently elected executive must 
negotiate with a legislature composed of many political parties.  “Presidential Parliamentarism” 
is in force at all levels of government, so the following theory does not distinguish between its 
applications to the federal or local level. 
2.4 A MODEL OF A MARKET FOR LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT 
We can formalize the above discussion to gain further insight into the relationship between 
legislature size and public spending in the Brazilian Presidential Parliamentary system.  Figure 
2-1 shows a special case of how an increase in legislature size would affect spending where the 
executive exchanges fiscal expenditures for legislative support. 
In Figure 2-1, the executive’s demand for votes in the legislature does not vary with respect to 
the “price” of the legislative support.  The demand for votes is perfectly inelastic, shown as the 
vertical dotted lines 𝐷1 and 𝐷2.  The demand is set to 2/3 of the total number of legislature 
seats12, based on the logic that the Brazilian executive must obtain the support of 2/3 of the 
legislature in order to enact his or her agenda without interference.  An inelastic demand for 
                                                 
12 The values assumed to construct this graphic are original number of seats = M = 10, change in seats = V = 4, slope 
of S1 = b = 1, intercept of S1 and S2 = a = 1, slope of S2 = (slope of S1*original seats)/(original seats + change in 
number of seats). This last slope emerges from the geometry of the supply curve hitting the maximum price at the 
total number of legislative seats, M (or M+V in the case of S2) 
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votes would occur where the executive is willing to pay any price in public budget resources to 
ensure that he or she has 2/3 of the votes in the legislature. 
The supply of votes in the legislature is responsive to the “price,” which is the amount of public 
budget resources the executive appropriates for each legislator’s projects.  The present model 
assumes that there is a uniform market price.  Additionally, the executive is able to obtain the 
total number of votes if he or she is willing to pay the maximum price.  For example, in 𝑆1 there 
are 10 seats, and the executive who pays P=11 will have the support of all 10 seats. In 𝑆2 there 
are 14 seats, and an executive willing to pay 11 will have all 14 seats.  This geometry facilitates 
analysis of the model. 
Figure 2-1 shows how equilibrium spending changes between two periods as a result of a change 
in the number of legislative seats.   At point A, there are 10 seats.  The executive “pays” P* in 
order to obtain 2/3 of the seats13.  When the size of the legislature expands, he or she will still 
want 2/3 of the new seats, so the demand curve shifts from 𝐷1 = 
2
3
𝑀 to 𝐷2 = 
2
3
(𝑀 + 𝑉), where M 
is the original number of seats and V is the change in the number of seats.  With more total seats 
available, there is also a shift in the supply of seats from 𝑆1 to 𝑆2.  These equations are defined 
by: 𝑝1
𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑚, and 𝑝2
𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑐 𝑚, with 𝑐 =
𝑏∗𝑀
𝑀+𝑉
 to ensure that both supply curves attain full 
cooperation of all legislators at the maximum price.   
Figure 2-1 depicts a situation where the new legislators have an overall profile where their 
willingness to accept a piece of the public budget in exchange for their vote is relatively similar 
                                                 
13 The seats are assumed to be divisible to ease the analysis. 
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to the legislators in 𝑆1.  For this reason, the supply pivots to the right.  The new equilibrium is 
point B. 
Under this model, the total spending must necessarily increase when the legislature expands.  At 
point B, the price must be identical to that of point A14 and there are more transactions that occur 
because there are more seats.  Total expenditures is equal to p*m, and increasing m while 
maintaining p constant must increase total expenditures. 
The above conclusion, in which an increase in seats leads to larger public expenditures, holds 
true even in the general case where the slope of the demand curve is allowed to vary.  In the 
general model, presented in the Appendix, it is possible for the “price” of the votes to decline 
and it will do so when twice the slope of 𝑆1 is less than the absolute value of the slope of 𝐷1.  
That is, the price of a vote can decline with the introduction of new seats when the legislators are 
relatively sensitive to price and the mayor is relatively price insensitive.  However, any 
reductions in price are not be enough to overcome the increase in quantity of transactions in the 
general model. Thus, the total expenditures must always go up when new seats are added to the 
legislature. 
2.5 POLITICAL AND BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES 
There are approximately 5,500 municipalities in Brazil.  They share similar political and 
budgetary structure due to the 1988 Constitution and subsequent legislation.  Elected officials 
include the mayor and councilors in each municipality.  The mayor is selected by simple 
majority for municipalities with fewer than 200k inhabitants, and by absolute majority for larger 
                                                 
14 The price before the change is 𝑝1
𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏
2
3
𝑚. After the expansion, 𝑝2








cites.  He or she then appoints the administration ministers and sets government policy for the 
next four years.  Councilors are elected at-large through an open-list proportional representation 
(PR) system.  There are often over 100 council candidates in an election due to vote transfers 
among candidates and to the fact that councilors are generously compensated. 
The budgeting process in Brazilian municipalities is regulated through the 1988 constitution15 
and the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law16.  The Pluriannual Plan is proposed every four years, 
during the first year of a mayor’s term and is adopted in the second year of the term. It aims to 
provide general guidance for the capital spending of the municipality. The Budget Direction Law 
(LDO) is passed on an annual basis.  It establishes a primary surplus goal for the following year, 
and it projects expenditures and receipts for the next three years.  Finally, the Annual Budget 
Law (LOA) establishes the maximum spending amounts permissible across different expenditure 
categories.  The mayor appropriates money monthly and is permitted to spend less on an item 
than is legislated in the LOA, but he may not spend more without seeking authorization from the 
Legislature.   
There are legal limits to municipal spending levels. The Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2000 
imposed a debt ceiling on Brazilian municipalities.  The municipalities were given 15 years to 
comply with a rule that limits debt to 120% of annual receipts17. After 2016, non-compliant 
municipalities lose their authorization to conduct credit operations and they become ineligible to 
receive a significant portion of intergovernmental transfers. However, compliant municipalities 
may take on additional debt as necessary and that might include when a mayor and legislature 
                                                 
15 Title VI, Chapter 2, Section 2 (of Budgets).  Art. 165 – Art. 169 
16 Lei Complementar No 101, 4 May 2000 
17 The 120% rule is from Senate Resolution #40, 2001. 
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has additional needs to spend money on coalition maintenance.  Figure 2-2 shows that in 2012 
and 2013 the modal debt as a percentage of revenues was 10%, well below the legal ceiling of 
120%.  As such, most municipalities have fiscal space to expand and contract public spending at 
their discretion.  
Some municipalities run annual deficits, and just as many run annual surpluses.  Figure 2-3 
shows that on average, municipalities tend to gravitate towards a situation of balanced revenues 
and expenditures, where the Nominal Budget Deficit is zero18. It is also apparent from Figure 2-3 
that nominal deficits were larger in 2013 than they were in 2012.  From 2012 to 2013, almost all 
of the bins above zero nominal deficit grew larger.  While this chart does not provide causal 
evidence that increased debts were a result of the seats expansions in 2013, the facts of Figure 
2-3 fit with this overall story.   
The number of municipal legislative seats grew significantly from 2012 to 2013. Figure 2-4 
shows how the legislative seat count is distributed by city population in 2012 and 2013.  From 
2005 to 2012, the number of seats in each legislature was tightly regulated by population.  
According to the 2004 Mira Estrela Supreme Court Decision, each municipality under 1M 
inhabitants was granted nine seats for the first 47,619 inhabitants, plus one additional seat per 
47,619 residents.  This led to the seat-count pattern represented by the step-wise gray points in 
Figure 2-4.   
The 58th Amendment was passed in 2009 and came into effect with the 2012 election.  The new 
legislatures that were seated on January 2013 were significantly larger than those of 2012.  For 
                                                 
18 The nominal budget deficit includes spending on the interest of previous municipal debt. 
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municipalities with populations under 1.05 Million, the new seat limit amended Article 29, IV of 
the Constitution to limit seats as: 
m) 9 councilors, in municipalities up until 15,000 inhabitants; 
n) 11 councilors, in municipalities of more than 15,000 and up until 30,000 inhabitants; 
o) 13 councilors, in municipalities of more than 30,000 and up until 50,000 inhabitants; 
p) 15 councilors, in municipalities of more than 50,000 and up until 80,000 inhabitants; 
q) 17 councilors, in municipalities of more than 80,000 and up until 120,000 inhabitants; 
r) 19 councilors, in municipalities of more than 120,000 and up until 160,000 inhabitants; 
s) 21 councilors, in municipalities of more than 160,000 and up until 300,000 inhabitants; 
t) 23 councilors, in municipalities of more than 300,000 and up until 450,000 inhabitants; 
u) 25 councilors, in municipalities of more than 450,000 and up until 600,000 inhabitants; 
v) 27 councilors, in municipalities of more than 600,000 and up until 750,000 inhabitants; 
w) 29 councilors, in municipalities of more than 750,000 and up until 900,000 inhabitants; 
x) 31 councilors, in municipalities of more than 900,000 and up until 1,050,000 inhabitants; 
 
This represented a sizeable increase for many municipalities.  For example, a city with a 
population of 140,000 would have had 10 councilors in 2012 and then would have been 
permitted to expand to 19 councilors in 2013.  This is almost a 100% increase from one year to 
the next, which provides a sizeable variation in the key explanatory variable from one year to the 
next.  While not every municipality expanded to this extent, many did increase the size of their 
legislatures19.   
The advantage of large and sudden changes in the explanatory variable means that several of the 
potential determinants of public spending, as introduced in the literature review above, will not 
have time to vary.  Thus, we can exclude them as factors driving a change in public spending 
from 2012 to 2013.  For example, one could make a strong case that public service demand 
factors such as income inequality or population would be relatively fixed between these two 
years.  Likewise, public sector supply factors such as factor prices and bureaucratic organization 
probably did not change greatly between these two years for most municipalities.  Finally, 
political institutions, other than the size of the legislature, were also held relatively fixed from 
                                                 
19 The decision to expand was made at the municipal level, which introduces a concern with policy endogeneity.  
Several estimation strategies are introduced below to check the potential bias that this would cause.  
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2012 to 2013.  To identify the effect of a change of the size of the legislature, this paper relies on 
the slow-moving nature of many of the important factors that determine public expenditures, and 
the fact that a change in legislature size should have acute effects that materialize immediately.  
An instrumental variable strategy is also used to verify the robustness of the fixed effect model. 
2.6 MODELS 
This section establishes the empirical model used to estimate the effect of seats on public 
spending and its components.  Aside from the number of seats in a legislature, the explanatory 
variables in the models are limited to time-variant factors that either have a large role in 
explaining the dependent variable, or are a potential source of omitted variable bias.   
2.6.1 Total Public Spending 
The total public spending for a municipality is modeled as: 
            Spendit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Seatsit + 𝛼2Receiptsit + Xβ + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it           (1) 
 
The dependent variable, Spend, is the (log) of a municipality i’s public spending, net of 
legislative costs, in year t.  Legislative costs are deducted from the spending variable because the 
focus of this study is the extent to which a change in legislature size affects general public 
spending, not legislature operations.  The parameter of interest is 𝛼1, which estimates the 
percentage change in public spending for a percentage change in the number of legislative seats. 
It is important to note that while 𝛼1 estimates the marginal change, many of the municipalities 
had very large changes in their legislature sizes.  As such, a simulation is conducted in the results 
section to help the reader see the estimated effect of these larger changes, which were typical of 
the 2012, 2013 policy change.  The Receipts variable represents the total municipal revenues for 
year t.  There is no a priori reason to believe that its exclusion would cause bias in the estimate of 
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𝛼1.  Nevertheless, it is time-variant and included in the model to take advantage of its strong 
predictive power for municipal spending and the precision that this generates for estimating other 
model parameters.  An additional vector of control variables, contained in X, is included in the 
model.  In one specification, X contains a flexible set of population variables and in another 
specification X also contains political variables to measure the strength of the opposition and 
political fragmentation among parties.  The political variables change from 2012 to 2013 because 
there are separate legislatures sitting in these two years.  Opposition strength and political 
fragmentation might be expected to complicate a mayor’s ability to hold together a governing 
coalition, and thereby increase expenditures.  These political variables might also be related to 
the municipality’s decision to adopt an increase in seats.  For example, one potentially 
problematic bias would be if incumbent mayors who faced strong opposition systematically 
increased legislature size and raised public expenditures to manage their coalitions. The 
municipality fixed effect, 𝛾𝑖, absorbs all the slow-moving variables that theoretically affect 
public spending.  Variables that are relatively fixed over the two-year time period that affect the 
supply and demand of public services and political institutions are contained in 𝛾𝑖.  The time 
fixed effect, 𝛿𝑡, absorbs general Brazil-wide trends that increased or decreased spending in 
municipalities. 
2.6.2 Spending Composition 
The composition of public expenditures is also modeled to investigate whether there are general 
patterns in how larger legislatures affect spending.  Research into spending composition must 
establish a meaningful typology of spending accounts.  Studies conducted at a national-level 
have focused on a distinction between “universal” and “targeted” spending (Tabellini, 2002), or 
between “transfers” and “public-goods” spending (Milesi-Ferretti et al, 2002).   In a local setting, 
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however, many of the social insurance programs are outside the discretion of the government.  
The relevant decision of the local government is to spend money on direct support of its political 
base (e.g. spending on appointed positions, targeted infrastructure projects) or on broad public 
services (e.g. health, education) for which it is more difficult for politicians to claim credit.   
This section of the paper examines the hypothesis that additional funds were directed to four 
functional spending categories: (A) Administration (B) Urban Infrastructure (C) Health, and (D) 
Education.  These are the four largest functional spending categories in Brazilian municipal 
government over the past decade.  The functional categories unfortunately mix current and 
capital spending.  For example, a new school or new hospital construction would fall into Health 
or Education spending.  Urban Infrastructure includes current and capital expenditures on public 
works.   
Elected governments must provision funds for direct administration and capital spending, but 
there is also evidence that governments in politically underdeveloped areas tend to overspend in 
these areas relative to “human development” expenditures on health and education (Delavallade, 
2006; Mauro, 1998).  Administration and urban infrastructure spending is potentially more useful 
to shore up a political base, since it is spending for which credit can be claimed by individual 
politicians.  In the case of administration, many jobs are appointed at the discretion of political 
leadership.  In the case of infrastructure, mayors imply in public fora that a neighborhood 
legislator was instrumental in procuring a given public work (if he happens to be part of the 
government coalition, of course).  Additionally, infrastructure spending is more conducive to 
corruption since contracts are large, complex and ripe for kickbacks.   
Health and education spending is less traceable to any particular politician since it passes through 
a bureaucratic organization before arriving to the general population.  The public service is 
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provided by professionalized corps of teachers and health workers, and is typically distributed 
only on the pre-condition of being a member of the community.  Given its retail-style nature, it is 
more difficult (and less profitable) to ration in exchange for political support. 
The four spending categories are modeled as: 
            SpendCategoryit = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1Seatsit + 𝜋2Receiptsit + X𝜃 + 𝜓𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜈it            (2) 
 
The model in equation (2) is identical to that of equation (1), except that the dependent variable 
is spending on Administration, Infrastructure, Health, or Education.  All measures are the same 
and the unit interpretations of the parameters in (2) are equivalent to equation (1).  
2.6.3 Model Estimation 
To obtain unbiased causal estimates of 𝛼1 and 𝜋1, one must ensure that the size of the legislature is 
not correlated with any omitted factors that also explain the size or composition of public spending. The 
main issue of concern is that the choice to increase the number of legislature seats in 2013 is a 
decision that is made by each municipality.  Cities with larger legislatures might also be the same 
kind of cities that have higher spending levels.  As such, any systematic correlation between 
Seats and Spending could actually be driven by those unobserved features of the politics or 
society those certain municipalities.  I use two approaches, fixed-effects and instrumental-
variable estimation, to address these research challenges. 
As discussed above, the large variation in seat sizes and the theoretical absence of lag effects 
prove suitable to the use of municipal fixed effects.  The baseline estimation provided below is 
OLS using fixed effects to remove persistent municipal features like social, economic, or 
political structure.  The standard errors are clustered by municipality. 
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The model is also estimated using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) as an additional check that 
the fixed effect model has addressed the potential endogeneity. The first stage estimates the 
predicted number of seats that a municipality would have based on the federal guidelines in 2012 
and 2013.  The change in guidelines between these two years is exogenous to the choices of the 
municipalities, provides adequate temporal variation, and is significantly predictive of the 
change in number of seats in municipalities. 
The model is estimated using the log of the dependent variable, non-legislative spending.  
Models are also estimated where the independent variable of interest, the number of seats, enters 
into the model untransformed (level) and as a logged variable.  The correct model depends on 
whether we think the percentage change in expenditures is a reflection of the change in number 
of seats or a change in the percentage of the number of seats.  For example, the effect of an 
increase of five seats would be seen as equivalent by the Log-Level model across all municipal 
sizes, but for the Log-Log model it would make a difference if those five seats were added to a 
small legislature vs added to an already large legislature.  The Log-Log model is correct if we 
think there is diminishing effect of adding seats on spending.  Both approaches are estimated and 
shown to be roughly similar across the relevant domain of legislature sizes. 
2.7 DATA & DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Municipal spending and revenue data are from the “Finances Brasil” (FINBRA) dataset, 
published annually by the Brazilian Treasury in the Ministry of Finance.  The spending 
categories are based on the FINBRA accounts, which are documented in Brazil’s system of 
public accounts (Brazil National Treasury, 2013).  The spending and revenue data are deflated to 
2010 Reais using the World Bank’s country deflator series for Brazil.  This paper uses the 
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population data from FINBRA.  It was cross-checked with the official population data from the 
Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE) and is nearly identical. 
All data for political variables are from the Brazilian Electoral Authority, the Tribunal Superior 
Eleitoral (TSE). For each election, the TSE publishes candidate-level information for all 
municipalities.  Information on Mayoral and Council races is available country-wide, and is used 
not only to measure the number of seats available in each year, but also to measure the size of the 
opposition and number of parties in each municipality.  The size of the opposition is defined as 
the number of legislators that are elected to the council from coalitions that are not affiliated with 
the mayor-elect’s coalition.  It is true that there is significant pressure on city councilors to join 
the mayor’s coalition, even if they were not originally elected as part of that coalition, so this 
measure is likely to be an imperfect proxy for opposition.  The imprecision is likely more severe 
in the 4th year of a term (e.g. 2013) rather than in the first year of a mayoral term (e.g. 2013), 
because legislators have more time to switch parties. 
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables and observations used in the model.  
The research is restricted to municipalities with populations under 1 million and over 10,000 in 
line with (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012) and other work that excludes small jurisdictions on the 
apparent grounds that the politics of small communities limits the extent to which politicians can 
expand or contract public spending to deal with maintenance of political coalitions.  As a result, 
the sample is roughly 2500 municipalities. On average, the total spending is 108 in 2012 and 122 
in 2013, indicating an approximate 13% jump in real expenditures between these years.  The 
average number of Legislature Seats also grew from 9.5 to 11.  The average percentage of 




Spending on Education (34.2%), Health (23.9%), Administration (14.0%), and Infrastructure 
(8.0%) were the largest municipal expenditure categories in 201320.  Together, these four 
categories accounted for 80% of all municipal expenditures.  Since 2002, there has been a 
general trend of increasing the priority of education (up from 29.8%) and health expenditures (up 
from 18.7%), while the share of expenditures to administration (down from 16.7%) and urban 
infrastructure (down from 9.9%) has fallen. 
The distribution of the shares spent on the big four municipal services is shown in Figure 2-5.  
The numbers cited above are averages, and Figure 2-5 illustrates the large variance in spending 
on services.  This variation in our dependent variables will likely reduce the precision of the 
estimates in the spending category models.  
2.8 RESULTS 
The estimates for equation (1) are listed in Table 2.2. The first row of coefficients are from the 
Log-Log model, where the log of the total expenditures is regressed on the log of the number of 
seats (and control variables).  The third row of the table contains coefficients from the regression 
of the log of total expenditures on the non-logged number of seats.  Each column provides a 
variation on equation (1). The first two models are the OLS and instrumented versions without 
the additional controls.  The third and fourth models are the regular and instrumented versions of 
equation 1 with the additional controls.   
The estimates of the effect are consistent across each of the model rows, although the estimates 
are less precise for the 2SLS estimates due to a loss of power associated with the two stages.  
                                                 
20 Again, this is for Brazilian municipalities with greater than 10k and fewer than 1M people. 
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Nevertheless, the inclusion of the 2SLS models shows that the fixed effects method does a good 
job of managing bias from the endogeneity of public spending and legislature size. 
The Log-Log model indicates that 𝛼1 is approximately equal to 0.09.  This means that a one 
percent change in seats is associated with a 0.09% increase in total expenditures.  Municipal 
legislatures experienced seat changes of 40% or 50%.  These increases are sufficiently larger 
than 1% that a simulation is preferable to understand the expected increases associated with such 
large expansions of the legislature.  Comparing the predicted values of two average 
municipalities (those with the mean values of the regression population on every variable except 
the number of seats), with 10 seats and 15 seats, the effect of 50% more legislators is 3.2%21.  
The same exercising comparing a change between 10 and 15 seats with the Log-Level model 
leads to an estimated effect of a spending increase of 3.17%22. 
The estimates suggest that a municipality that increased its legislature from 10 to 15 
representatives would expect to see an increase in spending of approximately 3% - 4%.  Given 
that the average municipality has expenditures of around R$ 65 million per year (in 2010 Reais), 
an increase of 3% is R$ 1.95 million.  Considering a 2010 minimum wage of R$ 510, this kind of 
spending increase would support approximately 320 annual minimum wage jobs.  Split 5 ways 
between the new legislators, this is R$ 390k of additional spending per additional legislator, or 
64 minimum wage jobs, in the average municipality of 50,000 residents. 
                                                 
21 Predicted spending on non-legislative activities for an average municipality with a legislature of 10 is 
R$ 65,170,996, and 67,631,400 for a legislature of 15.  The percentage effect is (67,631,400 – 65,170,996) / 
65,170,996 = 3.8% 
22 The percentage effect is  (66,829,960 – 64,779,624)/64,779,624 = 3.2% 
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2.8.1 Results for Spending Subcategories 
The estimates for the effect of legislative seats on the big four municipal expenditures are shown 
in Table 2.3.  The coefficients represent the percent change in categorical spending for a one % 
change in seats, or a one seat change, depending on whether one looks at the log-log or log-level 
model. 
 
The estimated effect of a change in seats on urban infrastructure spending is the most 
pronounced.  The OLS estimates are statistically positive, and the 2SLS estimates for urban 
infrastructure, while not statistically different from zero, indicate that the OLS estimates may 
have some downward bias.  Using 𝜋1 = 0.3 for the log-log model, this indicates that an increase 
of 0.3% of spending is expected for a 1% change in seats.  For municipalities that increased their 
legislatures by 40% or 50%, that is a substantial increase in infrastructure spending of 
approximately 10%.    
The estimates for the effect of a change in seats on health or administration spending is more 
ambiguous.  For health spending, the OLS estimates indicate half the size of the effect as is 
associated with urban infrastructure spending, but the 2SLS estimates suggest that there is some 
bias and adjusting for it makes the estimate close to zero and with large confidence bounds.  The 
effect on health spending appears as if it might be moderately positive since it is consistently 
estimated as so across all specifications, but the error bounds are just large enough to prevent us 
from saying they are statistically different from zero at conventional confidence levels.   
The effect of a change in seats on education spending is estimated near zero with small enough 
standard errors that we can say that the effect is statistically and economically close to zero.  
Education spending, in other words, appears less sensitive to changing legislature size, at least in 
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the short run.  This makes sense, because municipal education spending is highly regulated by 
the federal government. 
On the other hand, the expected change in spending for urban infrastructure due to a change in 
seats is very high.  The estimates are approximately 0.25 to 0.3 for the OLS models, and 
approximately 0.43 for the 2SLS models.  The 95% confidence interval for the OLS models is 
between 0.2 and 0.4, meaning that a municipality where seats increased from 10 to 15 could 
expect to see a 10% - 20% increase in infrastructure spending in 2013.  The estimates would be 
even higher if we resort to the 2SLS estimates.  The estimates for administrative and health 
spending are too noisy to conclude they are different from zero, but they are clearly below the 
effect that seat expansion has on infrastructure spending.  
This change in spending patterns indicates that the increase in public spending due to the 
increase in legislature size falls disproportionately into categories like urban infrastructure (and 
perhaps administration) that are more discretionary and less programmatic than health and 
education.  While programmatic spending on health and education is electorally useful to the 
executive, its encompassing nature is less beneficial to individual legislators.  The empirical 
findings fit broadly with our model, where the public sector grows with a larger legislature 
because the executive exchanges public spending for legislative support. 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
Over half a century of research in public finance and political sciences have identified a broad 
range of factors that contribute to the level and composition of public spending.  Recent literature 
has focused on political factors including how the legislature size affects spending. The dominant 
theoretical approach to the impact of legislature size on spending has been that larger legislatures 
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lead to higher spending through log-rolling.  This paper follows a different approach that applies 
to coalition governments where the executive has ultimate budget authority and must spend 
fiscal resources to maintain his or her coalition.  A model is developed that shows how 
expansions of the legislature in Presidential-Parliamentary systems must lead to higher cost of 
coalition maintenance, and a larger public sector. 
The paper estimates the extent to which larger municipal legislatures affected public spending 
and public composition in Brazil, where the data and institutional context are conducive to 
estimating this relationship.  Results indicate that a 50% increase in legislature size from 10 to 15 
seats leads to an expansion of between 3% and 4% in public expenditures.  Education 
expenditures hardly change in response to legislature growth, whereas urban infrastructure 
spending grew by approximately 10% for a 50% increase in legislative seats.  The large growth 
in infrastructure can be squared with the smaller growth in overall spending, since infrastructure 
spending represents a smaller share of the municipality’s overall budgetary commitment.  These 
findings are in line with other scholarship that points to the political usefulness of infrastructure 
spending and are also consistent with previous literature that points to larger legislatures as a 






Figure 2-1: Market for Legislative Support 
 
 





Figure 2-3: Distribution of Annual Nominal Deficit 
 
 



































































0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Education
For Brazilian Municipalities with populations between 10k and 1M
Frequency (y), As percent of total spending (x), Brazil 2012





Public Spending in Brazilian Municipalities, 2012 & 2013 
 OLS1 2SLS1 OLS2 2SLS2 
Number of Seats (Log-Log) 0.091*** 0.073 0.094*** 0.089 
 (0.025) (0.056) (0.028) (0.066) 
Number of Seats (Log-Level) 0.006*** 0.006 0.006*** 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes 
Instrumented No Yes No Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5120 5120 5022 5022 
Dependent variable is the Log of total municipal spending, net of direct spending on the legislature. 
Standard controls include logs of Total Receipts, Population, Population Squared, and Population 
Cubed.  Additional controls include logged opposition percentage and the Number of Parties.  
Population of interest is Brazilian Municipalities with between 10k and 1M inhabitants. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses below point estimates. Within r2 are about 0.97, and 
between r2 are 0.93. Statistical significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
Table 2.2: Public Spending in Brazilian Municipalities 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 2012 2013 Units 
Total Spending 108 122 Million Reais 
(2010) 
 (219) (253)  
Seats 9.57 11.08 Count 
 (1.6) (2.9)  
Revenues 114 129 Million Reais 
(2010) 
 (236) (270)  
Population 48670 47099 People 
 (84573) (83020)  
Opposition 45.1 48.9 Percent 
 (19) (19)  
Parties in Legislature 5.97 7.14 Count 
 (1.6) (2.1)  
*Means and (standard deviations) for 2012 and 2013. Population is all Brazilian 
Municipalities between 10k and 1M inhabitants. 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
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The Effect of a Change in Number of Legislature Seats on Public Spending 
Categories 
Spending Category \ Model OLS1 2SLS1 OLS2 2SLS2 
Administration Log-Log 0.165*** -0.051 0.180*** -0.040 
(0.052) (0.125) (0.060) (0.151) 
Log-Level 0.010*** -0.009 0.007 -0.010 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) 
Urban 
Infrastructure 
Log-Log 0.293*** 0.434* 0.245** 0.427 
(0.100) (0.247) (0.112) (0.295) 
Log-Level 0.022*** 0.039** 0.016** 0.039* 
(0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.024) 
Health Log-Log 0.047 0.115 0.066* 0.158* 
(0.031) (0.076) (0.036) (0.091) 
Log-Level 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.012 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
Education Log-Log 0.036* 0.037 0.030 0.028 
(0.021) (0.061) (0.025) (0.074) 
Log-Level 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) 
N  ~5100 ~5100 ~5100 ~5100 
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes 
Instrumented  No Yes No Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*The dependent variables are logged Brazilian Reais (2010 real) spent on Admin, Infrastructure, Health, or 
Education. The explanatory variable of interest is logged or level number of legislative seats. Standard 
controls include logs of Total Receipts, Population, Population Squared, and Population Cubed.  Additional 
controls include logged opposition percentage and the Number of Parties.  Population of interest are 
Brazilian Municipalities with between 10k and 1M inhabitants. Standard errors, robust and clustered by 
municipality, are shown in parentheses below point estimates. The exact number of observations is not given, 
since there is minor variation across each of the spending categories. Statistical significance is indicated at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
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2.13 APPENDIX: THE MARKET FOR VOTES, A GENERAL MODEL 
The structure of the supply curves remains the same as introduced in the body of the paper.  
When the number of legislative seats changes by V, the supply of votes shifts from 𝑆1 to 𝑆2.  
Notice that at the maximum price, the supply curve is consistent with the total number of seats, 
either M or M+V.   
 
 
Figure 2-6: Market for Legislative Support (General Model) 
The primary difference between this model and that introduced in the text is that the slope of the 
demand curve is allowed to vary.  As before, the task is to identify whether a change in the 
number of seats leads to a larger or smaller level of public spending, where the executive “buys” 
votes by making special appropriations for legislator’s projects.  The quantity of votes purchased 
is m, and the price at which they are purchased is p.  The equations for the supply and demand 
curves before (1) and after (2) the change in legislative seats (V), are: 
𝑆1:  𝑝1
𝑆 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑚               (A1) 
𝑆2:  𝑝1
𝑆 = 𝑎 + 𝑐𝑚                  (A2) 
𝐷1:  𝑝2
𝐷 = 𝑗 + 𝑑𝑚                  (A3) 
𝐷2:  𝑝2
𝐷 = 𝑘 + 𝑑𝑚              (A4) 
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 A number of parameters can be calculated once we have a, b, d, the original number of seats, M, 
and the change in the seats, V.  We can calculate 𝑐 =
𝑏 𝑀
𝑀+𝑉
, since 𝑆2 is restricted to attaining the 
same maximum price as 𝑆1 at the maximum number of potential seats.   𝑗 = −𝑑 𝑀, since all 
votes will be demanded at a price of zero.  𝑘 = −𝑑 ∗ (
2
3
𝑉 + 𝑀) since 𝐷2is a rightward shift of 
2
3
𝑉 from 𝐷1.  In order to illustrate these relationships, Figure 2-6 assumes that the demand curve 
slope is d = -1.  The supply curve intercept, a, is shown as a = 0, and the supply curve slope for 
𝑆1 is b = 1. 
To reiterate the main goal, we want to understand how spending changes with respect to a 
change in the size of the legislature.  Spending is equal to the total number of votes purchased 
times the cost of the votes, so Spending = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑚.  Both price and quantity change with respect 









                   (A5) 
Where p and m are the equilibrium price and quantity of votes exchanged in the first period.  










                                           (A7) 
Calculate how m and p change with respect to V by first finding the equilibrium quantity and 
price in the second period (when V has been introduced), and then take their derivatives with 
























                                        (A11) 
Before proceeding to the final equation, it is worthwhile to examine the components of A5 
individually.  The following are acceptable ranges for the parameters. 
−∞ ≤ 𝑎 ≤ ∞ 
0 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ ∞ 
0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀 
0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑀 
−∞ ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 0 
−∞ ≤ 𝑉 ≤ ∞ 








  and 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑉
.  Further assuming that the change in seats, V, is positive, then  
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑉
 could be 




 from going negative.  In the numeric case similar to what we have been using above 
where M = 10, V = 3, b = 1, d = -1, then a would need to be greater than 32, which is even 
bigger than k = 12 in this case.  In other words, an increase in seats almost always increases the 
number of votes exchanged, practically speaking.   
The key factor is  
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑉
, which can be either negative or positive.  In the case that it is positive, then 
total spending must increase, since it is the only term that can possibly be negative.  If it is 
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negative, then it must be sufficiently negative to offset the increase in seats exchanged and cause 
total spending to decrease.  Most of equation (A11) can be signed except two terms make its 
direction indeterminate.  The a term can cause the whole equation to be negative if a is 
sufficiently negative, but the magnitude to which this must be true is substantial.  The more 
important issue is the term, (2b+d).  Since d is a negative number, we do not know whether this 
whole term is negative or positive.  If 2b > -d, then price will increase with respect to an increase 
in seats.  In other words, the relative slopes of the supply and demand curves play a key role in 
deciding whether vote price goes up or down in response to an increased number of seats. 
To determine the total effect, substitute equations A6, A7, A10 & A11 into equation A5.  The 
result is complex and difficult to simplify. If, however, we assume that a = 0 as in our above 






          (A12) 
Here, we can sign 
𝜕Spending
𝜕𝑉
 as positive.  That is, if the a term is within a reasonable range, then 






3 CHAPTER 3: REALLOCATION OF EARMARKED HIGHWAY 
FUNDS UNDER A COSTLY BUDGETING PROCESS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The practice of earmarking, or designating the proceeds from particular revenue sources to specific 
expenditure categories, is a common concern in public budgets. Scholars have asked whether the 
practice is economically efficient, whether it increases public expenditures (Buchanan, 1963, 
Athanassakos, 1990), and why it happens (Bös, 2000). Many have also asked whether authorities 
actually comply with the spirit of the earmarking laws, given that monies can be reshuffled across 
accounts to ensure merely formal compliance  (Nesbit & Kreft, 2009). On this last point, the 
theoretical expectations and empirical findings in academic literature have long been at odds. If a 
government already spends in excess of new earmarked revenue, the budget authorities can claim 
that they are in formal compliance with the earmarking law (Wilde, 1968). They are then free to 
allocate money as if the earmarking law was never imposed. In this case, the theory goes, they will 
simply allocate the budget to various expenditure categories based on their marginal propensity to 
consume those goods out of new income. The result is that marginal increases in the earmarked 
revenue will lead to less than a one-for-one increase in spending on the earmarked good. 
Empirical research often finds the contrary: An extra dollar of earmarked revenues leads to larger 
spending changes than would be suggested by the marginal propensity to consume that good from 
income.  When intergovernmental aid leads to overall larger public expenditures than if all 
taxpayers had been given the same money, this is the “fly-paper effect” in the academic research23. 
The “flypaper” term has also been used more loosely to describe situations where federal aid fails 
                                                 
23 See (Fisher, 1982) and (Hines & Thaler, 1995) for reviews of this literature. 
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to crowd out other state spending (Knight, 2002), and when earmarks fail to crowd out spending 
on earmarked spending categories  (Gamkhar, 2000, 2003; Nesbit & Kreft, 2009).  A number of 
mechanisms have been proposed to explain why the empirical results diverge so greatly from the 
theory. This paper adds one more: costly budgeting procedures.  
The seeming contradiction between theory and experience disappears when the administrative 
costs of re-appropriating earmarked money are considered.  If reallocation costs are zero, then the 
normal view of earmarks prevails in that expenditures should grow in line with the marginal 
propensity to consume from new (earmarked) income.  On the other hand, a perfect flypaper effect 
is obtained by assuming reallocation costs are infinite.  Infinite reallocation costs entail that 100% 
of the earmarked income will be spent on the earmarked category. 
Legislators can typically reassign earmarked funds with some effort, which suggests that the 
realistic assumption is that costs are positive but not infinite.  Furthermore, heterogeneity among 
governments means that some will be willing to pay these costs to optimize their expenditures, 
while others will not find it worthwhile.  Aside from costs, I introduce another important source 
of heterogeneity, which is the extent to which governments rely on earmarked expenditures.  Given 
equal income and preferences, governments that receive a larger share of the revenues as earmarks 
have more to gain from re-allocation.  I suggest that these governments should be more willing 
than others to undertake a costly budgeting process in order to re-allocate earmarked funds to other 
uses. 
The theory is developed and illustrated using data from Oklahoma County governments from 1973 
to 2012.  The context within which the theory is explored is a familiar one. Natural resource 
revenues are earmarked for spending on infrastructure projects. In 2013, 34 US States had 
severance taxes, and 24 of those states had earmarked the revenues for a particular use. The most 
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common dedicated uses are for highways, education, conservation, and natural resource 
management (Brown, 2013). As shale gas production in the US has increased, there has been 
additional interest in levying severance taxes and much of the proposed legislation makes 
provisions for earmarking the additional revenue. The literature on earmarking and the flypaper 
effect is useful for understanding the effects of marginal funding changes. 
I present results that indicate evidence is in line with the theory.  I find that the typically large 
spending effect of earmarked revenues is mitigated by a county’s reliance on those revenues as a 
share of its overall budget. 
The implications of this theory are important.  It implies that the ability of earmarks to stimulate 
specific expenditures will be effective at low levels, but lose force as they become a larger portion 
of a budget authority’s total revenues.  Earmarked revenue can increase expenditures in a desired 
policy area if the costs of re-allocating those funds are sufficiently high.  However, as the 
earmarked funds play a mounting role in the overall budget of the government, there will be an 
increasing push to incur the re-allocation costs and appropriate the funds for more beneficial uses. 
3.2 THEORY AND LITERATURE 
Consumer theory is often used to understand the behavior of governments that receive aid (Wilde, 
1968). The parallel is drawn between governments that receive earmarked vs. general transfers 
and individuals who receive in-kind vs. lump-sum assistance. Those who receive lump-sum 
assistance are at least as well off, and possibly better off, than those receiving in-kind assistance 
since they can allocate the fungible dollars however they see fit.  In the case where the in-kind 
transfer is not practically binding, then they should offer the same welfare increase.  Several 
authors have recognized that the parallel between consumer theory and government budgeting is 
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not perfect because of the collective nature of the government decision making process (Bradford 
& Oates, 1971; Wilde, 1968).  However, the consumer theory analysis still provides a valuable 
starting point.  It is depicted in Panel A of Figure 3-1, which illustrates the budget allocation 
decisions of a government choosing between highway spending and expenditures on all other 
government activities.  The government has a limited amount of total budget resources, shown by 
the budget constraint line S.   
3.2.1 Budgeting Costs 
Given the shape of its utility curves, the government selects the optimal point on the budget 
constraint S, point A, where it has allocated its resources to purchase half highways and the other 
half government services24. If the government were to receive an influx of highway-earmarked 
funding, then its budget constraint would shift horizontally to the right to S’. To stay in formal 
compliance with the earmarking law, the government would have to spend at least the amount of 
the earmarked revenue on highways. Graphically, it would have to buy more highway than the 
location of the kink in the second budget constraint. This would not be a problem in the illustrated 
case, since the earmark is not practically binding.  In other words, it will easily spend the minimum 
required by the earmarking rule. Just as in the case of a transfer of general funds, the government 
has just received an influx in income it will expand its purchases in line with its marginal 
propensity to consume out of new income. Thus, conventional economic theory reasons, the 
municipality will end up at point B. The government is formally in compliance with the earmarking 
law at point B, and it is also maximizing the welfare of the community. 
                                                 
24 This is not so different than the allocation made by Oklahoma counties. On average, they spend about 40% of 
their revenues on highways. 
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The trouble with this rationale is that a great deal of academic literature finds that new earmarked 
income does not cause expenditures to expand from point A to point B.  Earmarked income is 
somehow different from general income, in that it appears to cause expenditures to expand from 
point A to point C. That is to say that the full amount of the marginal highway-earmarked revenues 
is allocated to highway expenditures. Explanations for the causes behind this phenomenon and the 
closely related flypaper effect are numerous, but none point to transaction costs in the budgeting 
process as a potential mechanism. 
The budgeting process of a government is a costly, time-intensive affair. This is true even for 
relatively small governments. Earmarked revenues often flow directly into designated accounts, 
called Funds. When a government has the authority to transfer money away from these funds, it 
often does so. As McCleary describes a World Bank survey on earmarking highway funds found: 
Allocations for road funds appear to depend on the condition of the general budget. When money 
is tight, earmarked funds may be temporarily frozen (as happened in Ghana) or diverted to other 
uses (as in Mali)…(McCleary, 1991, p92)   
These experiences are common, and they show that reallocating earmarked funds is possible.  
However, this does not mean that diverting money away from an earmarked fund is free or easy. 
A budget committee must convene meetings, review reallocation proposals, hear stakeholders, and 
ultimately rule on how much money to transfer, and to which accounts. Unless there is pressing 
need to reallocate money, legislators and the budgetary authority might not be willing to spend 
their time and effort on this task, especially since budget debates tend to re-open previously settle 
decisions. 
The decision to reallocate money away from an earmarked fund differs under the conditions of a 
costly budgeting process. In terms of Panel B in Figure 3-1, the decision to reallocate earmarked 
revenues incurs a fixed cost, labelled L, which shifts the government’s budget constraint inward 
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to the dotted line, labeled S”.  If a government wanted to re-allocate the funds, it would pay L and 
end up at point D.  If the cost of reallocating revenue is positive, then the traditional narrow view 
of an optimizing budget committee does not hold.  Put differently, the government cannot move 
to point B because that point is not available in the presence of budgetary transaction costs. Under 
a budgeting procedure that incurs sufficiently large costs, the government achieves the welfare-
maximizing result by avoiding paying those costs staying at point C.  This can be seen in Panel B 
of Figure 3-1, with large costs inducing the government to stay at point C where it gains utility of 
U” rather than falling to the lower utility level of U’’’ associated with point D. 
Where the budgeting costs are smaller, such as those shown in Panel C of Figure 3-1, the 
government may elect to pay those costs in order to optimize its consumption bundle.  The Panel 
C scenario suggests that a government facing a small L would move to point D since the utility 
levels, U’’’, associated with it are higher than the utility levels associated with a 100% increase in 
highway funding, U’’.  If the costs go to zero, then the situation converges upon the traditional 
analysis of lump-sum vs. earmarked revenues depicted in Panel A.  Governments should 
immediately optimize their consumption bundle since there is no cost to their doing so. 
Finally, there exists a budgeting cost that induces the government to be indifferent between re-
allocating to point D and staying put at point C.  This situation is shown in Panel D of Figure 3-1.  
Regardless of its decision, the government will find itself on utility curve U’’.  In Panel D, a re-
allocation of expenditures generates utility gains that are perfectly offset due to negotiation costs. 
 83 
 
3.2.2 Reliance on Earmarked Revenues 
The other important factor in a government’s decision to re-allocate is the proportion of its budget 
that come from highway-earmarked revenues25. The more dependent a government is on the 
earmarked highway fund revenues, the rightward shift in budget constraints from S to S’ will be 
greater in magnitude26. The government has more to gain by paying the cost of the negotiation and 
shifting some of the revenues to other government purposes.  Empirically, we would expect 
governments more reliant on the highway revenues to reallocate a greater proportion of incoming 
earmarked revenues than governments who are less reliant on the earmarked revenue source.  
A government budget committee might choose to reallocate funds if that reallocation leaves the 
municipality better off.  Formulated in terms of consumer theory and in reference to Figure 3-1, 
consider a budget committee with Cobb-Douglas preferences, 𝑈(𝐻, 𝐺) = 𝐻𝑎𝐺1−𝑎, with quantities 
of highway (H) and general government services (G), respectively.  The budget constraint is 𝑀 =
𝑃𝐻𝐻 + 𝑃𝐺𝐺, where M is total revenue. 𝑃𝐺  and 𝑃𝐻 are the relative prices of these goods and they 
are set to parity.  To distinguish general revenue from highway-earmarked revenue, use subscripts 
so that 𝑀 = 𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ. 
In scenario D, where the committee pays a fixed negotiation price27, L, to optimize its consumption 
bundles, the quantity demanded of highways and general government goods and services can be 
inferred from the Cobb-Douglas solutions as: 
𝐻𝐷
∗ = 𝑎(𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ − 𝐿)   and   𝐺𝐷
∗ = (1 − 𝑎)(𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ − 𝐿) 
                                                 
25 There is a parallel literature in consumer theory that suggests that the same income, received in different ways, 
affects spending behavior.  See (Lundberg, Pollak, & Wales, 1997). 
26 Technically speaking, general income must also fall to keep total revenues constant. 
27 Again, this cost could be interpreted as Legislative bargaining costs including costs to the committee members to attend meetings, gather 
information, and carry out the necessary administrative procedures to reallocate the funding. 
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In scenario C, where the committee must spend its earmarked revenues on highways, the quantity 
demanded of H and G is:  
𝐻𝐶 = 𝑎(𝑀𝑔) + 𝑀ℎ     and    𝐺𝐶 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑀𝑔 
The committee will select point D over point C if: 
𝑈(𝐻𝐷
∗ , 𝐺𝐷
∗ ) > 𝑈(𝐻𝐶 , 𝐺𝐶) 
Another way of phrasing this would be that the committee elects to pay L if the above conditions 
hold.  Substituting the quantities demanded above into the utility functions, the condition becomes: 
    (𝑎(𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ − 𝐿))
𝑎((1 − 𝑎)(𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ − 𝐿))
1−𝑎     >    (𝑎𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ)
𝑎((1 − 𝑎)𝑀𝑔)
1−𝑎 
Solving for L reveals that the committee will pay L to reallocate28 their spending if the cost is less 
than some quantity: 





The first term in parenthesis on the right hand side is the total revenue.  Call the second term on 
the right hand side 𝜌.  To better understand the 𝜌 term, normalize the total municipal revenue so 
that 𝑚𝑔 + 𝑚ℎ = 1 , where 𝑚𝑔  and 𝑚ℎ  are the shares of revenues from general sources and 
highway earmarks. 𝑙 is the negotiation cost as a share of total revenues.  This implies that 𝑚𝑔 =
1 − 𝑚ℎ, and the above equation can be re-written as: 
𝑙 < 1 −




                                                 




This reveals that the decision of the budget committee to switch from position C to position D in 
Figure 3-1 is based on the budget reallocation costs (L), the share of the revenues from earmarked 
funds (𝑚ℎ), and the preference parameter (a) for highway consumption.  An alternative form of 
this statement is 
𝑙 < 1 − 𝜌(𝑎, 𝑚ℎ) 
There is no closed-form solution to 𝜌(𝑎, 𝑚ℎ), but we do know that the Cobb-Douglas preference 
parameter lies in the range 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1.  So does the share of revenues from highway earmarks, so 
0 ≤ 𝑚ℎ ≤ 1.  Plotting 𝜌 as a function of 𝑚ℎ and for different given values of a, Figure 3-2 shows 
that 𝜌(𝑎, 𝑚ℎ) can be approximated by 𝜌(𝑚ℎ) for any given value of a.  
Figure 3-2 shows 𝜌(0.1, 𝑚ℎ) with a dashed concave curve and 𝜌(0.5, 𝑚ℎ) with a solid concave 
curve.  The solid line drawn directly from (0,1) to (1,0) is shown for reference. 𝜌 is insensitive to 
movements in a that we can approximate the decision equation with: 
𝑙 < 1 − 𝜌(𝑚ℎ) 
Importantly, Figure 3-2 shows that 𝜌 varies between 0 and 1 for the relevant domains of 𝑚ℎ and 
a.  The share of revenues from earmarked highway sources is related to the value of 𝜌.   𝜌 falls as 
𝑚ℎrises, indicating that the whole right hand side of the decision equation gets larger as 𝑚ℎ rises.  
A larger right hand side makes it more likely that the budget committee will elect to reallocate the 
earmarked funds.  Additionally, a larger (smaller) left hand side, 𝑙, will make it less (more) likely 




It is also informative to consider what would happen at extreme values.  If the re-allocation cost, 
L, were to go to zero, then the committee would be certain to optimize and it would end up at point 
B in Figure 3-1, which is the traditional view of general transfers.  If the re-allocation cost were 1, 
then budget committees would always stay at point C.  If 𝑚ℎ were zero, then the budget committee 
would never re-allocate, and if 𝑚ℎ were 1, then the budget committee would always re-allocate.  
These values fit well with the above theory and general intuition. 
3.3 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
County governments in Oklahoma receive a significant portion of their revenues through an 
earmarked Highway Fund, administered by the state. The relative importance of the Highway Fund 
in each county’s budget varies markedly both across counties and over time. In terms of the model 
presented above, Oklahoma county governments face different potential gains from reallocating 
part of their Highway Fund to non-highway uses. In the graphical language of Figure 3-1, counties 
experience different amount of rightward shift in their budget constraints due to influxes to the 
Highway Fund. The budget process of each Oklahoma county government is regulated by the 
County Budget Act of 1981, which prescribes a list of procedures that each county must follow to 
adopt a legal annual budget29. The budget act provides substantial homogeneity in budgeting 
procedures, although there is some allowance in the budget act for the counties to establish their 
own conventions for the conduct of individual meetings.  Given this budgeting environment, 
budgeting costs are assumed to be relatively fixed for each municipality across time.  To the extent 
that they do change over time, due to adoption of computers for example, these changes are 
assumed to be available to all counties at the same time.  Using an empirical strategy where fixed 
                                                 
29 Oklahoma Statute (OS) §19-1401. (State of Oklahoma, 2015) 
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effects control for budgeting costs, this section uses the Oklahoma county data to test the 
hypothesis that higher levels of dependence on earmarked revenues will lead to greater reallocation 
away from highway funds and to other general expenditures. 
3.3.1 Activities, Expenditures, and Revenues of Oklahoma Counties 
Oklahoma adopted its constitution and was admitted to the Union in 1907. The constitution 
delineates the boundaries of 75 counties. Harmon County was created from Greer County in 1909, 
and Cotton County was carved out of Comanche County in 1912 (State of Oklahoma, 1907). 
Oklahoma has neither created nor merged counties since 1912, which makes for a set total of 77 
counties throughout the study period of 1973 to 2012. In addition to counties, local governments 
in Oklahoma include towns, cities, and special districts. 
Oklahoma Counties perform a wide range of functions because they are the primary local 
government in unincorporated lands. They are responsible for maintaining the peace and property 
by fielding a sheriff and administering a county court system. Counties build and maintain roads 
and other transportation infrastructure. They are responsible for public record keeping regarding 
property and marriage, and even public welfare for “inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmity, 
or misfortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of the county (State of Oklahoma 
Constitution, Title XVII-3).”  A look at the average expenditure shares shows that while the 
counties do indeed spend money on all these functions, they spend a large share of their budgets 
on the construction and maintenance of highways. 
The counties receive, on average, approximately 40% of their revenue from intergovernmental aid. 
Nearly 30% of their revenue is from intergovernmental aid through the county highway fund. The 
other 60% are own-source revenues, which are evenly split between property taxes, other taxes 
(e.g. sales), and miscellaneous charges and revenue sources. 
 88 
 
3.3.2 Budgetary and Earmarking Rules for Oklahoma Counties 
The Oklahoma County Budget Act establishes the institutional framework for the budgeting in 
each county. Each county has a “county budget board,” which is chaired by the chairman of the 
board of county commissioners. The members include all elected county officials, who each have 
one vote30 . At the beginning of a budget cycle, the county budget board requests estimated 
revenues and expenditures from each county department or office31. It then prepares a budget that 
is published at least 30 days prior to the beginning of a new fiscal year32. Each departmental officer 
has the right to be heard by the county budget board before the final draft budget is published. Any 
transfer of money between Funds is required to be “shown as a transfer from the one fund and as 
a transfer to the other fund33.”   
The budget board must hold a public hearing on the budget no less than 15 days prior to the 
beginning of the new fiscal year. Any person may “present comments, recommendations, or 
information on any part of the proposed budget” at the hearing34. The adopted budget is to be 
examined and approved by the county excise board, who then “shall compute the appropriations 
and levy the taxes necessary for the county for the budget year in accordance with this act.35”  Any 
taxpayer may file a protest against illegality in the budget within 15 days of the county filing its 
budget with the State Auditor and inspector36. 
These budgeting procedures describe a lengthy and bureaucratic (and democratic) process where 
there is significant labor cost involved in allocating public money.  Re-allocation of earmarked 
                                                 
30 OS §19-1407. 
31 OS §19-1411. 
32 OS §19-1410. 
33 OS §19-1410. 
34 OS §19-1412. 
35 OS §19-1414. 
36 OS §19-1415. 
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funds is flagged by the budgeting procedures as an activity that must be negotiated, documented 
and subject to public review.  In short, there is clear evidence that budget committees bear 
significant time costs and incur additional scrutiny from re-allocating funds away from earmarked 
categories.  It is also clear that they have the authority to make reallocation decisions, so the cost 
of doing so is not infinite. 
3.3.3 The County Highway Fund and its Components 
The highway fund is an indispensable source of revenues for some counties. Figure 3-5 shows how 
the importance of the fund (as a percent of the total revenues) varies across counties and across 
time. Counties are ordered across the horizontal axis based on their median reliance value. The 
“reliance value” is on the vertical axis, with some counties counting on the highway fund as less 
than 5% of their total revenue (on the left), and some counties rely on revenues from the highway 
fund for over 60% of their revenues. The boxplots show the distribution, from 1973 to 2014 for 
each county. The median value is the horizontal line in the middle of each box, with the 25th and 
75th percentiles determining the bottom and top of the box, respectively.  Outlier observations are 
noted as points.   
There is substantial variation within each county over time.  Variation on this dimension is 
particularly important for the empirical analysis discussed below, since county fixed effects cause 
us to compare a given county to itself over time. It is not unusual for counties to experience an 
interquartile range of 10 percentage points over the study period, and the importance of highway 
funds for some counties is highly variable reaching an interquartile range of 40 percentage points. 
I provide additional evidence that the fixed effects are enough to provide identification on the 
parameter of interest through a robustness check, which uses components of the highway fund to 
instrument for the full fund.  The county highway fund receives money from three primary sources: 
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Vehicle Taxes and Licenses, Motor Fuel Taxes, and the Gross Production Taxes (GPT). In fiscal 
year 2014, the total distributions to the county highway funds equaled $291 million dollars. $126 
million was from Fuel Tax. $76 million was from the Gross Production Tax, and $89 million was 
from motor vehicle licenses. Figure 3-6 shows how these proportions have varied over time. The 
motor fuel tax has gradually become less important, and the motor vehicle tax has become 
increasingly important. The Gross Production Tax played a larger role in the early 1980s and mid 
2000s when the prices of oil or natural gas were relatively high.  
The State of Oklahoma levies a severance tax as an ad-valorem charge on the gross market value 
of Oil37, Gas, and Mineral production38. The Gross Production Tax has typically been set at 7% of 
the gross value of oil and gas, though there are provisions in the law to reduce the percentages in 
the case that price of oil falls below $17 per barrel or gas below $2.10 per thousand cubic feet 
(mcf)39.  Of these receipts, approximately 7% are apportioned to the county highway fund. These 
distributions appear as the GPT component of the highway fund in Figure 3-6. The funds are 
distributed so that, “Each county shall receive a proportionate share of the funds available based 
upon the proportion of the total value of production from such county in the corresponding month 
of the preceding year40.”  The annual lag in payments means that county authorities are able to 
calculate with a high level of certainty the amount of GPT money that will be available to their 
highway fund in an upcoming fiscal year.  
                                                 
37 “there is hereby levied upon the production of oil a tax as set forth in this subsection on the gross value of the 
production of oil based on a per barrel measurement of forty-two (42) U.S. gallons of two hundred thirty-one (231) 
cubic inches per gallon, computed at a temperature of sixty (60) degrees Fahrenheit.”  OS §68-1001. 
38 OS §68-1004. 
39 OS §68-1001. 
40 OS §68-1004. 
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The county highway fund receives substantial contribution from the gross production tax in 
counties that are endowed with natural resource production.  The GPT is levied on petroleum and 
natural gas production.  Figure 3-7 shows that the counties who are large oil producers are not 
necessarily important natural gas producers, and vice-versa. It also shows that the GPT is an 
important part of many county’s budgets, which is relevant because this provides variation in the 
extent to which a county’s budget is composed of highway revenues.  The importance of the GPT 
in county budgets varies significantly by county and over time.  The right column in Figure 3-7 
shows how GPT played an important role in county budgets in 1980s, its effects waned in the 
1990s and then it picked up again in the 2000s.  The revenues in the 1980s were due to petroleum, 
while the revenues in the 2000s are due to natural-gas production.  Note that because of the 
distinction between petroleum and natural gas, petroleum-rich/natural gas-poor counties for whom 
the GPT was an important revenue source in the 1970 never saw their revenue shares rebound in 
the 2000s.  Together, these trends across time and across counties provide important underlying 
variation in the extent to which counties rely on the highway fund for their revenue base. 
3.3.4 The Model 
Highway spending in Oklahoma counties is a function of the revenues, population, and 
geographical extent of a county. The theory discussed above and the literature on earmarking 
suggests that Oklahoma counties might treat revenue arriving through the Highway Fund as 
different from general revenues, which requires that general revenues and highway revenues be 
included separately in the model. This paper proposes a theory whereby counties that are more 
reliant on earmarked highway funds for their total revenues will be more likely to transfer money 
away from highway spending, given fixed negotiation costs. That suggests the effect of the 
highway-fund revenues is conditional on the volume of total revenues other than those from the 
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highway fund. Population for county i in time t is included as a control variable, as is its square. 
Fixed effects are included for counties and for years. The county fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖, pick up the effect 
of time-invariant factors such as the geographical extent of the county. The budgeting costs for 
each county are assumed to be relatively time-invariant, so they are also absorbed into the county 
fixed effect.  To the extent that the budgeting costs might vary over time due to improvements in 
technology or changes in regulations, it is assumed that they change uniformly across all counties.  
The year fixed effect, 𝛿𝑡, captures factors that change over time but are generally constant across 
counties. For example, this would capture the effect that a particularly bad winter in any given 
year has on necessary highway maintenance expenditures.  It would also control for statewide 
factors that change over time and affect budgeting costs, such as the adoption of computers.  
                 HwyExpit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Revit + 𝛽2HwyFundit + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it𝜶1,2 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it                   (1) 
HwyExpit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Revit + 𝛽2HwyFundit + 𝛽3(
HwyFundit
Revit
) + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it𝜶1,2 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it       (2) 
Highway expenditures and all revenues are measured in Thousands of USD (2010 real value), so 
the coefficients represent dollar changes in highway spending for a dollar change in revenues.  This 
model is estimated with and without the highway reliance term.  When it is estimated without 
highway reliance term, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽2 , which describes the dollar change in 
highway spending for a dollar change in highway funds, holding revenues constant.  It should be 
positive, between zero and one, since it indicates the share of highway funds that are spent on 
highways.  When the highway reliance term is added to the model, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽3.   
It estimates the extent to which a higher reliance on highway funds, as part of the total budget, 
affects total highway spending (holding revenues and earmarked funds constant).  The theoretical 
prediction is that counties that are more reliant on earmarked funds will be more likely to re-
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allocate these funds away from highway expenditures, so we expect to estimate a negative 
coefficient for 𝛽3.   
An additional variation is estimated for models (1) and (2), where the effect of the highway fund 
is conditional on the population of the county. Each model is also estimated by including an 
interaction term between the highway fund size and population. One might imagine a scenario 
where additional highway fund revenue is appropriated differently depending on whether a county 
has a larger or smaller population. This model is estimated as: 




+𝛽4(HwyFundit ∗ Popit) +  𝐏𝐨𝐩it𝜶1,2 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it                      (2b) 
 
3.3.5 Data 
The primary sources of data are the US Census Bureau’s Historical Finances of Individual 
Governments (IndFin) and the Oklahoma Tax Commissions records on county highway fund 
distributions. IndFin contains revenue and expenditure data for detailed accounts for 1967 and 
from 1972 to 2012 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). The county highway fund distributions are 
available for 1973 to 2014 (Oklahoma Tax Commission, 2014) . The common overlapping time 
period between the two data sources is 40 years, from 1973 to 2012. Accordingly, all models are 
estimated for all 77 counties over the course of 40 years from 1973 to 2012. This period captures 
significant temporal variation in highway funding and spending.  
Not every county appears in every year due to the nature of the data collection procedures at the 
US Census Bureau’s Individual Government Finances (IndFin) dataset. Figure 3-8 shows the 
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availability of these data with Oklahoma’s 77 counties arranged alphabetically in columns, and 
years in rows. Shaded cells indicate data availability for a county-year.  
All 77 counties appear in the dataset on five year intervals for years ending in 2 and 7 since the 
US Census of Governments was adminstered during these “benchmark” years. The US Census 
bureau carries out the “Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances” between the 
benchmark years.  The Bureau says that it randomly selects a sample of state and local 
governments every five years (in years ending in 4 and 9)41.  However, it is apparent from Figure 
3-8 that some counties always find themselves in the random sample for non-benchmark years, 
which suggests that the random sampling may be conditional on specific factors. Counties that are 
consistently included are overwhelmingly the highest populated counties (over 60,000 inhabitants) 
in the state.  Random sampling stratified on population would be unlikely to bias our estimates 
since population appears as a control in the model for this paper. Nevertheless, an additional model 
(#3) is estimated for only benchmark years (ending in 2 and 7) to check whether sampling bias has 
been addressed. 
3.3.6 Results 
The results from equations 1, 2 and 3 are presented in Table 3.3. Additionally, the estimates for 
each model are shown for versions a and b, where model b adds an interaction term for highway 
revenues and population. Version a is the model without the Highway Revenue reliance term 
(HRev/TRev).  This serves to facilitate comparison with estimates that disregard this factor.  
Models 1 and 2 are full sample estimates, while model 3 is the restricted sample estimate, using 
only benchmark census of government years. 




The estimates from model one indicate that, on average, county highway spending rises 55 or 68 
cents for every dollar of earmarked highway revenues.  While these point estimates are 
meaningfully higher than 0.37, which is the average rate at which counties spent their money on 
highways in 2012, only 1b comes close to being statistically significantly higher at a 95% 
confidence level.  So the evidence for a crowding out effect, whereby a disproportionately large 
portion of the highway fund revenues are being directed into highway spending, is suggestive but 
not definitive.  It could be that the overall crowdout effect is weak, or it could be that the crowdout 
depends on some additional heterogeneity not included in this model.  In that case, the average 
crowdout effect is weak, but this is deceptive since it is strong for some counties and weak for 
others.  The theory described above suggests that the additional factor is the reliance of counties 
on earmarked highway funds for their total budgets.    
Models 2a and 2b add the highway revenue reliance term (HRev/TRev) to control for the additional 
heterogeneity indicated in the theory section.  The reliance term has a statistically significant 
effect42 in the expected direction.  Recall that the hypothesis is that a higher reliance ratio would 
lead to greater re-allocations away from highway spending.  Thus, the expected effect on highway 
spending should be negative.  The direction of the reliance effect remains negative and roughly 
similar in magnitude for models 2a and 2b.  Taking model 2b as a preferred model since it 
incorporates both the highway revenue reliance term and an additional control, the magnitude of 
𝛽3 in equation 2b is $28,000 dollars less spending for a 1 percentage point increase in reliance on 
highways funds43.  This suggests that a county with a reliance ratio of 0.5 would spend $1.4 million 
less on highways than a similarly situated county with all its budget coming from general funds (a 
                                                 
42 The t-statistic on the reliance ratio term in model 2a is significant at p=0.054. 
43 All values are expressed in 2010 real prices. 
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reliance ratio of zero).  Considering that the median county in Oklahoma spent $4.2 million per 
year on highways in 2012, this would represent a significant proportion of the budget that was 
transferred out of the highway fund into other uses.   
The estimates in model 3 show that we reach the same conclusion even when using the restricted 
sample.  The estimates from model 3 represent a reduction of $30,000 to $36,000 per additional 
percentage point of reliance on highway funding.  So the estimates are close to that of model 2b.  
Any bias in the full sample is actually causing our estimates to be too low.  The estimates from the 
restricted sample strengthen the conclusion that reliance on earmarked funds, holding revenue 
constant, is associated with lower highway spending. 
The marginal effect of highway funds on highway spending in models 2a and 3a show that the 
displacement effect is conditional on revenue reliance and population.  In other words, there is 
not just one crowdout effect. Rather, the magnitude of the transfer of funds out of highway 
spending depends on several factors.  Overall, Table 3.3 gives strong evidence that highways 
who receive a greater proportion of their revenues as highway funding transfer more money out 
of their highway spending account, which is consistent with the hypotheses that emerge from the 
theory.   
3.3.7 Robustness Check 
An important concern with early empirical work on crowd-out effects was that external aid was 
endogenously determined by a recipient’s preferences (Knight, 2002).  Under these circumstances, 
it would look like communities spend 100% of the earmarked money on the earmarked category 
because that was what they were intending to spend the money on all along.  One potential source 
of omitted variable bias could be that HighwayExpenditures could be correlated with 
HighwayFunds through each county’s response to oil or natural gas prices. For example, higher 
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oil prices might increase the size of the highway fund due to higher fuel taxes, and also increase 
operating expenses of highway construction and maintenance. To address this concern, an 
additional model is estimated that instruments the highway fund with a component of the fund that 
varies in an essentially random way. A county’s gross production tax (GPT) revenues are 
determined by a county’s reserves and production of oil, natural gas, and minerals, and by the 
prevailing market prices of those commodities. Evidence is presented below that shows gross 
production tax revenues are conditionally uncorrelated with fuel-tax revenues, and that GPT 
revenues also have a strong first-stage correlation with highway fund, since the GPT is an 
important component of the fund44. The first stage of the 2SLS model is: 
            HwyFundit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Revit + 𝛼2GPTit + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it𝜶3,4 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢it                        (R1) 
 
The second stage is estimated with: 







) + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it𝜷4,5 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it   (R2) 
 
3.3.7.1 Evidence for Validity of the Instrument for Highway Funds 
The estimates in the instrumented model are consistent with those of the non-instrumented model 
for the coefficients of interest. Due to concerns that the size of the Highway Fund might be 
associated with energy price fluctuations that would also affect highway spending, an instrumental 
variables strategy is used. The instrument chosen is a component of the highway fund that is 
                                                 
44 The instrumented variable also appears in the fractional term. For now, I have performed a manual 2SLS where I 
estimate the first stage using all exogenous variables that also appear in the second stage plus the instrument, and 
then I predict a value for highway funding. That predicted value is then used in the second stage by itself and part 
of the fractional term. This means that the standard errors are not corrected for 2SLS. 
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thought to be vary in an essentially random way with the extent to which fuel prices affect a county. 
A good measure are the fuel tax revenues, which are an important component of the highway fund.  
Table 3.4 shows the results from a regression of the FuelTax on GPT and the other first stage 
covariates. The estimated (conditional) covariation between GPT and FuelTax is statistically 
insignificant with over 2000 observations and it is also practically near zero. This gives some 
confidence that the instrument is conditionally uncorrelated with the most obvious potential 
omitted variable. 
The first stage of the 2SLS estimates is shown in Table 3.5. GPT is highly correlated with 
HwyFund, which is expected since a portion of the money earned through the gross production tax 
is legally obligated to be placed into the county highway fund. The fact that GPT is correlated with 
HwyFund, but it is not conditionally correlated with the most obvious source of omitted variable 
bias strengthens the case of the instrument.  
3.3.7.2 IV Estimates 
The instrument, however, turns out to not materially affect the above conclusions in that the 
direction and magnitude of the coefficients on the reliance ratio remain roughly similar, and also 
remains statistically significant. Table 3.6 compares equation 2 with and without instrumenting 
for highway funds.  The effect for a 1 pp change in the reliance ratio is in the neighborhood of 
$25,000 USD.  Additionally, the third column in Table 3.6 shows that the change in highway 
spending without the ratio variable in the model is approximately 0.7 cents per dollar.  Again, 
this is well above the 0.37 average highway spending and thus suggestive that a flypaper effect is 
operating for earmarked highway revenues.  Most importantly, the instrumented estimates 
provide additional evidence that a county’s overall reliance on highway funds leads to lower 
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highway expenditures, all else equal.  In other words, there is reason to believe that the crowd-
out effect is conditional on the reliance ratio. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Academic literature often asks whether governments actually comply with their own earmarking 
laws. Empirical literature finds that they typically do, contrary to what would typically be expected 
of an optimizing budget authority.  I propose a theory whereby a costly budgeting procedure can 
provide friction that accounts for at least some of the contradiction between theory and experience.  
If budget transaction costs are zero, then the normal view of earmarks prevails in that expenditures 
should grow in line with the marginal propensity to consume from new income.  Alternatively, a 
perfect absence of crowding-out is obtained by assuming reallocation costs are infinite. I present 
results that indicate evidence is in line with the theory.   
I also show that the amount of money diverted from earmarked funds is related to the share those 
funds make up of total revenues.  Given that governments face different negotiation costs and 
different potential gains from reallocating funds, it stands to reason that there is not just one 
crowding-out effect.  Rather, it varies based on the costs and benefits that communities face from 
the reallocations. I find that the typically large spending effect of earmarked revenues is greatly 
mitigated by a county’s reliance on those revenues as a share of its overall budget. 
The implications of this theory are practically important because it implies that the ability of 
earmarks to stimulate specific expenditures will be effective at low levels, but lose force as they 
become a larger portion of a budget authority’s total revenues.  In a world where earmarked taxes 
are suggested left and right by politicians, it is useful to have theory and evidence that they work 







   
   
   
   
  
    
   
   







Figure 3-3: Expenditure Shares in Oklahoma Counties, 2012 
 
   





Figure 3-4: Revenue Sources for Oklahoma Counties, 2012 
 
 











OIL & GAS PRODUCTION & RELIANCE 
ON SEV TAX 
 Left Column: Production Values (in MM 2010 
USD) 
 Right Column: Severance tax as a percent of total 
county budget 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The scale is 
the same over time, so a county changing from red 
to orange means it fell below the 30% reliance 
threshold. 
Sources: Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Production), US 
Census Bureau (GIS Shapefiles) 
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Expenditures in Oklahoma Counties, 2012  (Thousands) 
 n median mean sd min max 
Population 77 22.12 48.72 107.37 2.48 718.63 
Administration 77 1141 1936.77 3280.67 89 22997 
Health 65 396 1086.71 3758.93 30 30247 
Education Aid 5 2190 5305.20 8088.63 3 19370 
Highway 75 4219 4959.25 3204.17 120 17046 
Police & 
Corrections 
76 1291 3467.46 8739.65 3 55717 
Hospital 15 7241 25894.67 53318.27 3 205712 
Judicial 74 277.5 685.81 1876.95 43 14978 
Interest on Debt 19 163 1914.37 4750.67 7 17140 
Public Buildings 33 158 1003.64 3405.99 1 19646 
Other Spending 75 2013 3726.41 9022.40 51 70846 
*Descriptive statistics are shown for counties that were observed to have non-zero expenditures in a given 
category. The number of observations below 77 represents the number of counties that reported zero 
expenditures on a given category in 2012. 
Table 3.1: Expenditures in Oklahoma Counties, 2012 
 
 
Revenue Sources for Oklahoma Counties, 2012  (Thousands) 
 n median mean sd min max 
Population 77 22.12 48.72 107.37 2.475 718.63 
Property Tax 77 1931 5772.91 14169.15 152 94654 
Other Taxes 74 2272 4226.38 11372.17 233 97885 
Highway Fund 75 3268 3644.93 2580.39 4 13945 
Other IGR 76 980 2499.40 4796.06 39 30651 
Charges and Misc 
Rev 
76 1771 7537.68 24924 42 200368 
Other Revenue 2 1604 1603.50 2212.54 39 3168 
Hwy Rev Pct of Rev 77 26.56 28.36 18.12 0 61.43 
GPT (Gross Prod 
Tax) 
77 747 1164.50 1142.94 156.38 5401.31 
*Descriptive statistics are shown for counties that were observed to have non-zero revenues in a given category. The number 
of observations below 77 represents the number of counties that reported zero revenues in a given category during 2012. 


























0.025** 0.023** 0.022** 0.018** 0.035*** 0.026** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) 
Highway Fund 
Revenue 
0.566*** 0.683*** 0.663*** 0.822*** 0.793*** 0.923*** 
 (0.175) (0.178) (0.212) (0.218) (0.178) (0.173) 
Population 32.417*** 36.739*** 29.051*** 33.174*** 39.361*** 41.626*** 
 (8.547) (7.895) (9.198) (8.165) (10.325) (9.613) 
Pop^2 -0.067*** -0.048*** -0.062*** -0.039*** -0.055*** -0.027** 
 (0.009) (0.01) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) 
HRev*Pop  -0.002***    -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0)  (0)  (0) 
HRev/TRev  -22.728* -28.429** -30.382** -36.441*** 
   (11.568) (11.464) (12.498) (12.179) 
Constant 607.836 339.916 1343.698*** 1220.316*** 876.660** 924.073** 
 (502.614) (507.447) (336.635) (328.375) (422.153) (408.332) 
N 2110 2110 2110 2110 592 592 
r2 0.362 0.386 0.375 0.406 0.44 0.462 
Cells Contain Coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors). All models have county and year fixed-effects.  All revenue and 
spending values are in 1000s of real USD (2010), and Population is 1000 residents. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 3.3: Oklahoma County Highway Spending, 1973 - 2012 
 
 
Conditional Correlation of GPT with FuelTax 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
GPT -0.009 0.0087 
Rev -0.001** 0.0005 
Pop 11.17*** 1.56 
Pop*Pop -0.0098*** 0.0016 
Year and County FEs, Robust Ses, N=2103 





Oklahoma County Highway Spending, 1973 - 2012, robustness check 




General Revenue 0.022** 0.021*** 0.026*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Highway Fund Revenue 0.663*** 0.844*** 0.776*** 
 (0.212) (0.09) (0.1) 
HRev/TRev -22.728* -25.141***  
 (11.568) (4.149)  
Population 29.051*** 21.312*** 28.658*** 
 (9.198) (7.585) (8.114) 
Pop^2 -0.062*** -0.055*** -0.064*** 
 (0.011) (0.01) (0.009) 
Constant 1343.698*** 1170.350*** 21.996 
 (336.635) (438.944) (423.004) 
N 2110 2056 2056 
r2 0.375 0.318 0.264 
Cells Contain Coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors). All models have county and year fixed-effects.  
All revenue and spending values are in 1000s of real USD (2010), and Population is 1000 residents. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 3.6: Oklahoma County Highway Spending, 1973 - 2012, robustness check 
 
  
First Stage to estimate HwyFund 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
GPT 0.907*** 0.108 
GRev -0.006 0.004 
Pop 24.2*** 3.2 
Pop*Pop -0.016 0.004 
Year and County FEs, Robust Ses, N=2103 
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4 CHAPTER 4: ADOPTION OF OWN-SOURCE REVENUE IN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: THE CASE OF A PUBLIC LIGHTING 
TAX IN BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Local governments in many developing countries rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers for 
their revenues (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini, 2010; 
Gervasoni, 2010).  While there are good reasons for this practice45, academic research has 
consistently found that own-source revenues drive a bevy of positive outcomes, including 
restrained government spending, lower corruption, and better government responsiveness.  In 
many cases, local governments possess the authorization necessary to institute local taxes, so 
increasing own-source revenues depends on their decision to exercise taxing authority.  A natural 
question then is, what factors might cause transfer-dependent governments to increase their own 
fiscal effort? 
This paper lays out three categories of explanation (revenue need, politics and policy diffusion) 
and tests them against each other in the context of Brazil’s municipal light tax.  Results indicate 
that adoption of a local lighting tax was weakly associated with smaller revenues. The strength of 
the opposition in the legislature and the adoption of the tax by neighbors were strongly 
associated with the probability of adoption.  I interpret these results as evidence that many of 
Brazil’s municipal governments are open to taxing their residents if they are suffering revenue 
shortfall.  However, political considerations play a significant role in own-source tax adoption. 
                                                 
45 The two most common justifications are a lack of revenue collection capacity at the local level, and the need to 




Own-source revenues are fiscal resources that a government collects from its residents in the 
form of taxation.  Other major funding sources for governments include income from returns on 
owned assets (e.g. natural resource ownership) or through external aid.  The distinction between 
these revenue types arises repeatedly in academic literature, and the general consensus is that 
own-source revenues are associated with greater economic efficiency and better governance 
outcomes. 
4.2.1 The Benefits of Own-Source Revenue 
This argument has a long and noble lineage, including in grand works that argue representation 
in the modern democratic state is the result of taxation (Huntington, 1993) (Bates & Lien, 1985; 
Huntington, 1993; Musgrave, 1992; Tilly, 1985).  The theory, which draws heavily on European 
history, views government as a ruler or group of elites trying to maximize their wealth and glory.  
Where political leadership faces tight budget conditions and must tax its subjects, it will be 
forced to bargain with society.  In exchange for tax revenues, leaders relinquish some control of 
decision-making institutions.  Ross provides the first contemporary, cross-country econometric 
treatment of this theory and concludes that holding revenues constant, taxation without 
commensurate public service benefits is often followed by more democratic institutions within a 
few years (Ross, 2004).  Using the case of Argentina, Gervasoni shows that this logic may also 
be applied to sub-national governments (Gervasoni, 2010). 
Governments that receive non-tax revenues (e.g. from natural resource proceeds or through 
governmental aid46) find themselves in a position where they are able to provide public services 
                                                 
46 See (Beblawi, 1987) and (Moore, 2004) for a discussion of natural-resource vs. territorial rents.   
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through minimal taxation of their citizens. Political accountability can subsequently deteriorate 
because the government is less dependent on its local residents for its revenues47.  Empirical 
studies have pointed to many cases where governments with significant non-own-source 
revenues are more corrupt and supply inferior public goods, compared to what they would 
provide with comparable own-source revenues48.   
While studies continually find a robust connection between own-source revenues and better 
governance outcomes, the mechanisms by which this happens have not been settled.  One set of 
explanations focuses on the incentives facing the ruling elite.  Since governments with non-own-
source revenues are typically larger49 and more corrupt than governments funded out of own-
source revenue, it is more valuable to hold power. This naturally requires the ruler to spend 
heavily on maintaining his position, which leads to more patronage, prevention of social group 
formation and repression50.  Expenditures on these activities, at the very least, represent good 
money being diverted from public services.  A more serious risk is that the diverted public 
monies are used to fund activities that undermine government institutions.  Other scholars have 
hypothesized that poor service quality comes about because outside revenue is more difficult for 
citizens to track, especially where it fluctuates substantially from year to year.  Unless the 
municipality is fastidious in its bookkeeping, political leadership has more latitude to 
                                                 
47 The theoretical literature on the political aspects of the natural resource curse can be found in (Beblawi, 1987; 
Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 1999, 2001, 2013; Van der Ploeg, 2011).  See in (Easterly, 2008) for a discussion of similar 
effects of international aid, and see (Gervasoni, 2010) for similar outcomes resulting from intergovernmental aid. 
48 (Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini, 2010) and (Gadenne, 2012) offer evidence that larger transfers lead to 
corruption in Brazilian municipalities.  (Fisman & Gatti, 2002) find larger transfers are associated with more 
corruption in US States.  (Gadenne, 2012) shows that increases in own-source revenues in Brazil are more likely to 
be spent on education and health infrastructure than on administration.     
49 See the “flypaper effect” literature.  See  (Hines & Thaler, 1995) for a review, and (Remmer, 2004). 
50 See (Ross, 2001) for a list of “supply side” factors at the national level, and (Gervasoni, 2010) for a discussion of 
how the supply-side explanation operates at a sub-national level. 
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misappropriate public funds because citizens do not have a sense of how much money is in the 
coffers51.  Finally, a surfeit of non-tax revenues means that rulers can avoid the need to bargain 
with, and make concessions to, representatives of various social groups. 
Recent literature has increasingly focused on how citizens regard own-source revenues 
differently than outside public funds.  In order to demand government fiscal efficiency, citizens 
require four conditions.  They need information about the budget; they need an interest and 
ability to evaluate the budget; they need an interest and ability to mobilize for changes in the 
budget; and they need the ability to monitor and punish deviations from budget execution.  This 
appears to be asking a lot, since citizens must overcome a collective action problem to make 
progress on demanding information, mobilizing against unjust budget arrangements, and 
investigating budget execution.  However, angry taxpayers have been historically adept at 
sparking enough grievance and mobilization to overcome the collective action problem. In fact, 
recent research gives evidence to confirm that the “angry taxpayer” is an important factor in 
pressuring the government for better public services.  (Broms, 2014) shows that there is a 
relationship between taxpaying and political interest at the individual level. (Paler, 2013) finds in 
a field experiment that people who go through the motions of taxation are more likely to want to 
monitor the governments budgets, and (Martin, 2014) finds that group members are more likely 
to monitor and sanction group leaders where group resources are procured by direct taxation. 
The psychological mechanism by which this appears to happen is through loss-aversion52.  In the 
context of public revenues, loss aversion means that the reduction in wellbeing that citizens 
                                                 
51 This transparency argument is discussed in (Ross, 2013) and (Humphreys, 2005). It is also the mechanism that is 
assumed by (Gadenne, 2012). 
52 See (Hines & Thaler, 1995) for loss-aversion and the flypaper effect, and (Martin, 2014) for experimental research 
into how loss-aversion increases civic engagement (monitoring and sanctioning) of citizens in Uganda. 
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experience when they face curtailment of an existing public service is larger than the loss they 
feel when an expected equal increase in public service fails to materialize.  Practically, this 
means that citizens will fight tooth-and-nail to defend small existing public services, but they 
may fail to organize and press for large beneficial changes.  Lucy Martin tells a vivid story about 
how Ugandans poured fish refuse on the city hall when their trash collection stopped.  However, 
despite heavy media coverage, there was little public protest when corruption in the Ugandan 
government put hundreds of millions of potential international aid dollars in jeopardy  (Martin, 
2014). 
It is unlikely that all forms of taxation have the same effect on citizen monitoring.  Intrusive and 
conspicuous taxes destined for local government probably generate more political interest than 
hidden taxes directed to a central government.  The intrusiveness of a tax is measured by the 
amount of time and money that a taxpayer must spend.  Property tax is intrusive because it 
requires a taxpayer to sit down and write a large check to her government.  Income tax is 
intrusive due to its size, and also because of the administrative time it requires.  However, 
income taxes are generally destined for a distant central or state government, where the taxpayer 
knows she has minimal influence.  Sales taxes on day to day purchases, although transparent on 
the goods receipt, are less intrusive because of their relatively small influence on buying 
decisions.  Excise taxes are the least intrusive, since they are built into the advertised price of a 
product and the consumer cannot easily know what shares of their expenditure goes to the 
government and to the supplier.   
4.2.2 Endogenous Adoption of Own-Source Revenue 
Own-source revenues likely play a role in good government as the literature suggests, but it is an 
uphill battle for politicians to adopt them.  The revenue’s conspicuousness, the very feature that 
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also makes it beneficial, makes its adoption politically difficult.  For local public officials, it is 
politically advantageous to leave the difficult work of tax collection to the central government.  
As soon as a local government steps up and begins to collect intrusive taxes, it accepts a large 
political liability in that it must demonstrate that the money was well spent.  Shrewd local 
politicians will want to avoid this scenario, so there is natural reticence for local governments to 
institute direct taxation when they can avoid it. 
Central and state governments can push local governments to increase their fiscal effort, but the 
local authorities must ultimately choose to adopt the additional taxes.  Federal reforms that 
unilaterally shift tax collection responsibility to the local level may run into problems if the local 
government refuses or is unable to collect revenues53.  Thus, it is useful to understand what 
factors make municipalities more likely to undertake own-source revenue collections if the goal 
of policy is to push them in that direction.  There are few examples of research that examines the 
factors that make adoption of own-source fiscal effort more likely54, and even fewer in the 
context of developing countries.  This paper aims to make progress on the broader question of 
own-source tax adoption by way of examining the case of a local lighting tax in Brazilian 
municipalities. 
                                                 
53 Fiscal devolution without capable local tax collectors happened in Senegal, and it led to serious deterioration of 
local government services (Juul, 2006). 
54 (Sjoquist, Smith, Walker, & Wallace, 2007) investigates “time to adoption of local sales tax” in Georgia, USA, and 




4.3.1 The Case of the Brazilian Municipal Public Light Tax 
Brazilian municipalities depend heavily on transfer revenues from the Federal and state 
governments.  A typical municipality receives 95% of its fiscal resources in the form of 
intergovernmental aid (Brazil National Treasury, 2013).  Nevertheless, there are opportunities for 
a Brazilian municipality keen on adopting own-source revenue.  Local legislatures can choose to 
impose a service tax (ISS) on local businesses.  They may also adopt property taxes on urban and 
rural lands.  The federal government has worked hard to encourage adoption of urban property 
taxes in recent years, though property taxes are a major source of revenue for only the largest 
municipalities.  Taxation of rural property is rare, and even then it must be shared with the 
federal government.  There is an important distinction in Brazilian tax law between taxes and 
contributions.  While local taxes may be appropriated for any use, local governments are also 
permitted to adopt “contributions.”  Contributions are akin to user-fees in the sense that they are 
targeted at users of a specific public service and their revenues are earmarked for the service in 
question. 
The public lighting contribution, also known as the Contribution to the Cost of Public Lighting 
(COSIP) was formally adopted by a constitutional amendment in December of 2002 (EC #39).  
Some municipalities had previously used a public lighting tax but critics challenged its 
constitutionality and won in the Supreme Court.  The tax was re-authorized as an earmarked 
“contribution” and the COSIP amendment allowed municipalities to charge a lighting fee, 
designed by the city, on residents.  Many municipalities that had previously been reluctant to 
adopt the lighting tax due to its doubtful legality were swift to approve the lighting contribution 
following the 2002 legislation.  Figure 4-1 shows the percent of municipalities that charged some 
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kind of a light tax in 2002 and how that rate rose over the next ten years.  Adoption was 
particularly swift in the four years following the amendment.  The general trend was that 
approximately 50% of the municipalities used a light tax at the time the legislation was passed in 
2002.  By 2012, nearly 80% of the municipalities received revenues from a COSIP lighting 
contribution. 
The proceeds from COSIP are formally earmarked for public lighting, and while the tax burden 
varies by municipality, a rough estimate is that it typically increases the light bill by 10%55.  The 
Brazilian media regularly highlights the high cost of electricity, so an additional tax of 10% is a 
clearly unpopular policy choice that will draw attention.  Nevertheless, public lighting, the 
service that citizens supposedly receive for this payment, is visible and valued.  Thus the choice 
of adopting this tax is something that mayors and councilors are likely to weigh carefully 
because of its political salience.   
COSIP is an especially expedient tax to study for the purpose of research into own-source 
revenue adoption due to its low administrative burden.  Politicians considering whether to adopt 
the contribution need not concern themselves with the administrative costs or required 
investment to collect because these factors are negligible.  The electric distributor places an ad-
valorem or specific surcharge on light bills, depending on the design of the contribution.  The 
distributor then transfers the tax revenues to the municipality throughout the year.  As such, the 
tax is easy to calculate and piggybacks on a billing system that is already operational and 
effective. 
                                                 
55 For example, the tax in the São Paulo Capital is approximately R$ 4 per month.  On a home that uses 200 kWh per 
month at the standard rate of R$ 0.26 per kWh and pays R$ 56 per month for electricity, that represents a tax of 7%.  
In Rio de Janeiro, the tax is R$ 8.71 per month for COSIP and the electricity tariff of R$ 0.38 per kWh.  Effectively, 
the same household is paying a tax of 11% on their light account.  In RJ, the tax varies with consumption level. 
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COSIP offers Brazilian municipalities a relatively simple opportunity to increase their own-
source fiscal effort.  Given this context, I ask if it is possible to identify systematic factors that 
contribute to the adoption of the policy.  If such factors do exist, are they primarily a result of a 
municipality’s calculation of need for revenues and public lighting expenditures? Does political 
leadership, opposition strength, or ideology matter?  Might adoption of this own-source revenue 
be due to the influence of the experience of other municipalities?  These factors are tested in a 
comprehensive model to examine their contribution to the decision to adopt COSIP. 
4.3.2 Factors in the Adoption of COSIP 
A municipality’s adoption of COSIP, an own-revenue source earmarked for public lighting, 
might be explained by three broad categories of factors: revenue need, politics, and diffusion.  
The most obvious is a need for revenue.  This need could arise because market conditions favor 
an increase in the equilibrium quantity of public service, or because COSIP can compensate for 
shortfalls elsewhere in the budget.  Since the adoption decision is made by political institutions, 
one could expect the nature of the institution and political leadership would affect the likelihood 
that new taxes are be adopted.  Finally, local governments might be influenced by the adoption 
of a tax in nearby municipalities. This last category is typically studied under the rubric of policy 
diffusion.   
Revenue need arises from an imbalance between revenues and a desired level of public service 
provision.  One way to think about this is to imagine that two municipalities have a similar level 
of revenues and provide the same levels of public services.  However, one municipality develops 
a higher demand for the service or a more efficient supply of the service.  In this case, a 
relatively larger gap will emerge between the amount of the service provided and the amount of 
service demanded.  An under-provision of goods will result, and the municipality will seek 
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additional revenue to meet that need.  While we do not have information on the quantity of 
public lighting demanded in each Brazilian municipality, we can test demand-related factors as is 
typically done in the public finance literature.  Population, income, and demographics are 
standard candidates.  In the case of public lighting, it also makes sense that demand would be 
affected by the land area of the urban centers and the distribution of the population between the 
urban conglomerations and rural areas.  We can also proxy for demand using prior levels of 
public lighting, where a municipality with levels well below what would be expected given its 
population, size, and other control factors should have a higher demand for public lighting.  
Likewise with the supply of the service, we do not know how much public lighting would be 
supplied at a given spending level.  Cost-factors that are likely to significantly affect the supply 
include the price of electricity and regional labor costs.  The number of urban centers within a 
municipality is also likely to affect cost of provision, since the light company suffers cost 
inefficiencies from having to service many small conglomerations rather than one large one.  
Larger distances between the urban centers also likely contributes to higher service costs.  Where 
demand factors are relatively higher (all else equal) or supply factors are more favorable (all else 
equal), we should expect to see a larger desire for revenue and a higher likelihood of adopting 
COSIP. 
Revenue need is also affected by a municipality’s spending on services other than public 
lighting.  Higher spending, given a fixed level of public revenues, leads to larger budget deficits.  
Brazilian municipalities face sanctions from the federal government if their balance sheets 
deteriorate too much.  A mayor confronting a precarious budget situation would do well to adopt 
COSIP, even if the municipality did not need that money for additional public lighting.  To the 
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extent that the mayor is already spending on public lighting, he may divert those funds for other 
purposes and replace them with the COSIP revenues. 
Political institutions and leadership attributes in a municipality might affect the likelihood of 
COSIP adoption.  Mayors that are ideologically left might be more reticent to impose additional 
taxes on the consumption of electricity, since consumption taxes are typically understood to be 
regressive.  Mayors that are more fiscally conservative might push the tax to achieve a more 
balanced budget.  There is a great deal of homogeneity in formal institutions for the budget and 
tax process in Brazilian municipalities, since they are defined in the constitution.  One factor that 
has been found to be important for the adoption of new legislation is the number of veto points 
(Tsebelis, 2002).   In Brazilian municipalities, one manifestation of this exists in the form of 
opposition councilors, who are able to block legislation.  For that reason, it is worthwhile to 
compare the importance of the number of opposition members in the legislature during the times 
of non-adoption and of adoption. 
Finally, the adoption of the tax might be influenced by the activities of neighboring 
municipalities.  There are many examples where analysis finds neighborhood policy effects, but 
one must be careful to separate “influence” from “common contextual effects (Braun & Gilardi, 
2006).”  A finding of neighborhood influence often raises the question as to the mechanism by 
which the influence occurred.  In their study of the diffusion of anti-smoking policies, (Shipan & 
Volden, 2008) cite four mechanisms that they call learning, economic competition, imitation, and 
coercion.  Their concept of learning is quite general, but Braun and Gilardi usefully formalized it 
as ”the acquisition of new relevant information that permits the updating of beliefs about the 
effects of a new policy (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p306).”  This is distinct from learning about 
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policy advocacy (which arguments work best) and policy implementation (which policy structure 
works best), but for Shipan and Volden it is part of the “learning” package.  
In the public budgeting literature, (Sjoquist, Smith, Walker, & Wallace, 2007) separate diffusion 
mechanisms into spillover effects, tax competition, and copycat behavior.  The first two could 
easily be grouped into the “economic competition” mechanism in the Shipan and Volden 
typology, and the copycat behavior is quite clearly imitation.  It is difficult to see how the 
adoption of public lighting might be a matter of municipal competition, since this tax is imposed 
on the relatively immobile tax base of residential and commercial electricity connections, and it 
is just one tax in a list of many others.  It is also unlikely that adoption of the COSIP is owed to 
coercion, since Brazilian municipalities are formally independent and generally left to their own 
devices on matters such as public lighting.  Adoption of the COSIP could be due to “learning,” in 
the sense described above.  We might expect municipal governments look to their neighbors to 
evaluate the political fallout and the policy achievements of COSIP adoption.  Adoption of the 
policy amongst one’s neighbors has two distinct learning effects.  First, it introduces the 
municipality to the notion that this policy exists and is potentially a reasonable and rational thing 
to do (awareness).  Second, it provides an opportunity for the municipality to learn about the 
details of policy implementation (evaluation).  As more neighbors adopt the tax, awareness rises 
and pressure mounts on the administration to go along with the neighbors and adopt the tax.  
However, additional adoption also provides local governments with the opportunity to evaluate 
the experience of the earlier adopters.  As one might expect with tax initiatives, they are likely to 





I evaluate the relative influence of revenue need, politics and diffusion on the likelihood of 
policy uptake in the four years immediately following the constitutional amendment at the end of 
2002.  It was during this time that there was a flurry of adoption activity, with 1,370 
municipalities choosing to implement the lighting tax.  I rely on the Brazilian Census Bureau’s 
survey of municipalities to flag whether a municipality had a light tax in a given year  (IBGE, 
2013), and adoption is inferred when a municipality transitioned from a negative to positive 
status regarding tax implementation.  Also known as the “Profile of Municipalities,” the IBGE’s 
survey instrument asks a wide range of questions regarding administrative practices.  It 
consistently inquires whether the city has a lighting tax, and has been tracking this information 
prior to the adoption of the lighting tax amendment in the end of 2002.  As discussed above, 
many municipalities had already instituted some kind of public lighting tax by the time the 
amendment, so they are not included in the analysis.  Observations for most municipalities are 
available in 2002, 2004, 2005 & 2006, the years in which there was rapid uptake of the tax.  To 
infer whether a city adopted the tax during this time window, I examine whether municipalities 
that had not adopted as of 2002 had adopted as of 2006.  For a small group a municipalities that 
did not appear in the 2006 survey, I used their 2005 adoption status. 
Table 4.1 shows the number of municipalities in the dataset by their tax adoption status in a 
given year.  There were 5,390 municipalities with observations in the 2002 profile.  Of these, 
2,648 already had a lighting tax in 2002, and 2,742 did not.  Of the municipalities that had not 
adopted as of 2002, 1,370 of them had instituted the lighting tax by 2006, which is a 50% rate of 
adoption.  47.3% of the same population did not adopt during the four year window, and 2.7% of 
these municipalities did not have data available.   
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Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the population of municipalities that had not 
adopted as of 2002.  For example, the city of São Paulo is not in this sample, since it adopted a 
light tax prior to December 2002.  The lighting tax was adopted by 1370 of the 2667 observed 
municipalities, which means is a 51% adoption rate56.   The values used for the independent 
variables are the mean values over the 2002-2006 timeframe.  The largest city in this population 
is Rio de Janeiro, with over 6 million inhabitants. Six other cities with over 1 million residents 
had not adopted as of 2002.  The analysis was conducted with and without these observations, 
but results did not differ significantly so these cities are included in the descriptive and 
multivariate analysis57. 
Table 4.3 shows the units of the variables as they appear in the descriptive statistics table and in 
the multivariate model below.  Many of the variables are logged for inclusion in the multivariate 
model, some are in percent (from 0 to 100), and a few are indicator variables coded as either one 
or zero. 
The data for lighting tax adoption come from the Brazilian Census Bureau’s annual “Profile of 
Municipalities.” (IBGE, 2013).  Data on GDP, Population, and Municipal Geographic area are 
from IBGE (IBGE, 2012, 2014).  Urban land area was computed and made available through a 
project sponsored by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Association (Embrapa) (Miranda, 
Gomes, & Guimarães, 2005).  Microdata on the availability of public lighting in 2000 was 
collected as part of the 2000 census.  Each examiner recorded whether a home had public 
lighting in its vicinity (IBGE, 2000).  I summarize this measure at the municipal level by 
                                                 
56 The 2667 number is equal to the count of municipalities (2,742) that had not yet adopted the tax in 2002 minus 
the number of these municipalities (75) that were not available in the 2006 dataset. 
57 The large cities that were tested as outliers are Rio de Janeiro, RJ; Belo Horizonte, MG; Curitiba, PR; Porto Alegre, 
RS; Guarulhos, SP; Goiania, GO; and Campinas, SP. 
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calculating the proportion of surveyed homes in a municipality that were located in 
neighborhoods with public lighting in the year 2000, two years prior to the beginning of the 
lighting tax adoption window.  Municipal revenue and expenditure information is from the 
Brazilian Public Finance dataset published by the Ministry of Finance (Brazil National Treasury, 
2013).  It is interesting to note that the average budget position was 99%, meaning the average 
municipality spent about 99% of its total revenues over this time frame.  All data on political 
variables is from the Federal Electoral Authority (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) do Brasil, 
2015). 
Figure 4-2 shows the timing of the lighting tax implementation during the adoption window.  Of 
the 2667 municipalities that had not adopted as of 2002, 1370 of them had adopted the tax by 
2006, which left 1297 municipalities that had not yet adopted the tax.   The Brazilian Census 
Bureau (IBGE) did not administer the survey every year.     During the adoption window, the 
survey was completed in every year except for in 2003, which is the reason for the fact that 2003 
is missing from Figure 4-2. Some of the adoptions that appear to have occurred in 2004 likely 
took place in 2003.  The dependent variable in the model is a binary adoption indicator, so the 
exact timing of policy uptake is not critical to the analysis. 
4.5 MODEL 
I approach the analysis by modeling adoption in a conventional logit framework.  The 
probability of adoption is a function, 𝐹(𝑉) =
ⅇ𝑣
1+ⅇ𝑣
 , of a linear combination of factors.  The 
model is: 
               PR(Adoption𝑖) = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑊𝑖𝛼 + 𝑍𝑖𝛾 + 𝜃𝑟)        (1) 
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Adoption𝑖 is coded as true if a municipality adopted the lighting tax in the 2002 to 2006 
timeframe, false if they did not adopt over this period, and null if they had adopted prior to 2002, 
thereby being excluded from the model.  There are four classes of independent variables, denoted 
as X, W, Z, and 𝜃 in the above equation.  𝑋𝑖 is composed of the “revenue-need” variables.  The 
model’s X contains the demand factors: municipal GDP per capita, population size, public 
lighting availability immediately prior to the adoption window, the land area within a 
municipality that is “urbanized”, and the land area of the entire municipality (Miranda et al., 
2005).  The public lighting supply factors such as wage levels and electricity prices are not 
included, but they should be relatively uniform on a regional basis, and would thus be addressed 
by the model specification with fixed effects.  Revenue-need factors that are the result of budget 
tie-in are also contained in X.  This includes total municipal revenues less contributions58, and 
the budget position (spending as a percent of revenues).  All the values in X vary somewhat by 
year, and so their average values over the adoption timeframe was used in this cross-sectional 
model.  
W contains political leadership and institutional variables.  It includes a dummy variable to 
indicate whether the mayor is affiliated with a classic liberal party or with the most cohesive left 
party - the workers party (PT).  W also contains a measure for the amount of institutional friction 
caused by opposition presence in the legislature: the percentage of legislators that were elected 
from outside the Mayor’s coalition  (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) do Brasil, 2015).  
                                                 
58 COSIP is a contribution, and figures into the revenue accounts as such.  It is typically a large part or the whole 
part of this account, so subtracting contributions from revenue is a way to estimate non-COSIP revenues. 
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Z holds the diffusion variable, which is intended to proxy the “learning” concept as laid out in 
Shipan and Volden.  It is the percentage of neighboring municipalities in a micro-region that 
were using COSIP in the year prior to a municipality’s adoption of COSIP. 
The model contains the term 𝜃𝑟, which represents area fixed effects for a micro-region.  
Microregions are sub-divisions within states, defined by the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE).  
Claims about causality in this model hinge on the extent to which we believe that all necessary 
covariates are included.  Public lighting provision, wealth, and political culture are likely to vary 
regionally. To capture this regional heterogeneity, I include regional fixed effects to control for 
slow-changing unobserved differences, including for regional market variables such as electricity 
and labor prices.  The regional fixed effects also address political variables that have regional 
ubiquity such as political culture or social conditions. There are sufficient observations available 
in this dataset for regional fixed effects. Altogether there are 556 microregions in Brazil.  Figure 
4-3 shows the number of municipalities in each microregion.  It is most common for a 
microregion to contain between 5 and 10 municipalities, but there are several regions with up to 
20 municipalities.  Using regional fixed effects means that useful variation in the model’s right-
hand-side variables comes from temporal change and cross-sectional differences between 
municipalities only within the same region.  The fact that the number of municipalities in each 
micro-regions is small means that the cross sectional variation employed by the model is 
substantially circumscribed.  While not perfect, this approach goes a long way towards 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and thus limits concerns over policy endogeneity. 
The goal of the model proposed in this paper is to test explanations in a comprehensive model 
specification as a way to evaluate their strength while controlling for the other explanations.  
Identification relies on two arguments.  First is a theoretical argument that all relevant variables 
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have been included in the model.  The safest way to view the model is one of covariates, with a 
broad set of theoretically motivated controls. Second, the case for identification is helped 
through the use of regional fixed effects to control for slow-moving factors in an entire region.  
The estimates are also compared across multiple specifications to test their stability. 
4.6 RESULTS 
There is evidence that several of the factors are closely associated with policy adoption.  Among 
the most important of these include a municipality’s size, sources of alternative revenues, a 
strong political opposition, and the influence of nearby municipalities.  All variable classes 
(economic need, politics, and network effects) appear to be associated with the decision to adopt 
a tax.  Perhaps just as important as discovering factors that are associated with adoption is the 
fact that there is significant room for improvement in the model. While the list of model factors 
is quite comprehensive, there are several factors beyond the usual suspects that influenced the 
decision to adopt the lighting tax. 
Model estimates and marginal effects appear in Table 4.4.  I present two model specifications; 
one without and one with micro region fixed effects.  The logit coefficient estimates are listed in 
the last two columns, and the marginal effects for the average municipality appear in the left two 
columns59.  Point estimates of the coefficients appear above their robust standard errors, in 
parentheses.  The coefficients are reasonably stable across the two specifications, which 
increases our confidence that the marginal effects are reliable approximations of the partial 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables. 
                                                 
59 Marginal effects are calculated for the mean value of each independent variable.  For factors with log 
transformations, the mean value is the average of the logged value. 
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Several estimates merit consideration.  A municipality’s population is a strong predictor of the 
city’s propensity to adopt a lighting tax.  The model is based on the log of population, and the 
estimate is that a 1% increase in population is associated with a 0.23 percentage point increase in 
the probability of a lighting tax.  It’s not uncommon for Brazilian cities to grow at a 5% annual 
rate.  Taken literally, this estimate suggests that each year a city experiencing stable 5% growth 
would, all else equal, increase its chances of adopting the tax by around 1% per year.  Since the 
estimate is based off of a cross-sectional sample, the results stem from the fact that larger cities 
are more likely to adopt the tax.  Despite a strong positive relationship between population and 
tax adoption, there were other factors in play.  Several small municipalities that chose to adopt, 
and multiple large cities that avoided levying the tax.  Another “need” factor is the availability of 
alternative revenue sources.  The relationship is negative, with the estimate showing that a 1% 
increase in other revenue sources is associated with a reduction in the probability of adoption by 
0.21 percentage points.  Revenues are all measured in terms of 2010 real value.  Annual 
increases (in real terms) vary significantly depending on the state of the national economy and 
federal tax collection, but even a large increase of 5%-10%, which was common during the 
boom years of the mid 2000s, would be roughly associated with an increase of only 1 to 2 points 
in the probability of adoption.  This is not a particularly large effect, considering the fact that 5% 
of a municipal budget can easily amount to a million Reais, or jobs for a hundred people.  Figure 
4-4 shows the predicted probability of adoption given a municipality’s population60.  The solid 
gray line uses actual data, and the dashed orange line is the predicted adoption rate for the same 
municipalities with 5% lower revenues.  The dollar amount of this revenue shortfall is shown by 
the dotted line (right axis).  For example, a municipality with 30,000 people (and otherwise 
                                                 
60 These simulation charts are based on Model (1), since the coefficients are roughly similar and it is estimated for 
nearly all of the observations in the population of interest. 
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average) had an expected probability of adoption of 0.6.  A loss in 5% of revenue for this 
municipality would be approximately R$ 600,000, and that would be associated with a 1 
percentage point higher probability of adoption.  The model and magnitude of the estimate 
shows that while an administration’s decision to adopt the tax is unmistakably influenced by a 
need for revenue, it is not an overwhelming decision-factor. 
Increases in the chance of adoption are associated with more public lighting in 2000, prior to the 
adoption window.  This likely captures an endogenous relationship, where municipalities that 
were previously good at providing public lighting were more likely to adopt the tax.  Note that a 
zero or positive coefficient on this factor is evidence against the argument that mayors in laggard 
municipalities adopted the tax to close a “public lighting gap.”  If that had been the case, the 
coefficient would have been negative: previously low levels of public lighting would be 
associated with a higher rate of adoption. 
Stronger opposition in the municipal legislature is associated with a lower rate of policy 
adoption.  The magnitude of this effect is substantial, where a 10 percentage point increase in 
opposition increases the expected probability of adoption by 0.02 percentage points.  Large 
fluctuations in the political composition of a municipal legislature is a fact of local Brazilian 
government.  Figure 4-5 shows how an increase of the opposition by 20 percentage points leads 
to a change in the probability of policy adoption across population levels.  That is, an opposition 
with 20 percentage points more seats in the legislature is associated with a 5 percentage point 
reduction in the probability of policy adoption.  There are likely some threshold effects in this 
relationship, not modeled here.  Nevertheless, this analysis strongly supports the notion that a 
robust opposition is associated with slower policy adoption, for better or worse. 
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Finally, the proportion of a municipality’s neighbors that already had the tax in 2002 was 
associated with higher rates of adoption.  The direction and magnitude is robust to the inclusion 
of regional fixed effects, suggesting that the result is not due purely to regional patterns of 
adoption. Adoption within microregions in 2002 ranged widely from 0 percent to 100% with a 
fairly uniform distribution.  Figure 4-6 shows the increase in probability of adoption associated 
with a 20 and 50 percentage point increase in policy uptake of neighboring municipalities.  If the 
proportion of nearby municipalities with the policy increased by 20 percentage points, this would 
be associated with an increase of 5 percentage points in the probability of adoption.  With 50 
percentage points higher adoption rate, a municipality would be 10 points more likely to 
implement the new tax policy.  These effects are large, though they diminish as more nearby 
municipalities adopt the policy. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Many local governments in developing countries are highly dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers.  The benefits of this arrangement are many and varied.  Countries can take advantage 
of economies of scale in tax administration, the central government can use disbursements to 
maintain control over local governments and to bolster anticorruption efforts.  Developing 
countries can also distribute resources across regions to address large income disparities within 
the country.  However, recent academic literature has increasingly found virtue in increasing the 
fiscal effort of local governments.  The fiscal link between citizens and their government is 
important because it appears to contribute to more efficient allocation of resources and a more 
accountable government.  Since the adoption of own-source revenue is a decision that often must 
be made by local governments, its adoption is all but assured.  Politicians are typically loath to 
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increase taxes, so the politics of fiscal effort become an important problem that merits policy and 
academic attention. 
This paper examines several potential factors in local Brazilian governments’ decisions to adopt 
a low-cost public lighting tax.  Using a comprehensive model that includes fiscal, political, and 
neighborhood factors, I find that the most important factors in adoption are the size of the city, 
the availability of alternate revenues, the absence of a strong political opposition, and policy 
uptake among neighboring municipalities.  The estimates are robust to specification with micro-
regional fixed effects, which suggests that these relationships hold across the country and are not 
merely a reflection of regional differences. 
Several interesting results emerge from the analysis.  First, while the availability of other public 
revenues is associated with an identifiable increase in the probability of tax adoption, its 
influence is not particularly strong.  Municipalities with lower public revenues (conditional on 
the other factors) were only marginally more likely to adopt the lighting tax.  Similarly, the 
availability of public lighting prior to the tax adoption period showed a positive or no 
relationship with the likelihood of adoption.  These observations are evidence against simple 
claims that the tax was adopted purely to raise revenue, or purely for historically disadvantaged 
municipalities to catch up in terms of public lighting service. 
The size of the legislative opposition and the number of nearby municipalities that had the tax in 
2002, prior to the adoption window, were particularly influential factors.  A twenty percentage 
point increase in the proportion of opposition legislators translated into a decreased probability 
of adoption of 5 percentage points.  Meanwhile, a twenty percentage point increase in the 
neighborhood adoption rate was associated with a 6 percentage point rise in the probability of 
adoption, even when controlling for diverse regional variation. 
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Some of these factors are relevant for policy considerations.  Legislative opposition is not a 
feasible point of intervention, but network effects between neighboring municipalities appears to 
be a promising mechanism for introducing local governments to this policy option.  Policies that 
raise the tax capacity of regional leaders and that facilitate the sharing of these experiences 
would fit with the findings of the research presented here.  Overall, the Brazilian experience with 
the lighting tax and other efforts to increase the tax collection efforts of local governments has 
demonstrated progress towards a healthier fiscal relationship between citizens and the providers 












Figure 4-2: Adoption of Cosip Light Tax, 2004 to 2006 
 
 






























Population is 2667 Munis with no Lighting Tax in 2002.




Figure 4-4: Adoption by Population & Shortfall in Alternative Revenues 
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Lighting Tax Adoption Status of Brazilian Municipalities 
  Tax in 2006  
  No Yes Unknown Total 
Tax in 2002 No 1,297 1,370 75 2,742 
Yes 275 2,334 39 2,648 
Unknown 0 0 163 163 
 Total 1,572 3,704 277 5,553 
Source: Perfíl dos Municípios 
Table 4.1: Lighting Tax Adoption Status of Brazilian Municipalities, 2002-2006 
 
Descriptive Statistics for BR Munis without Light Tax in 2002 
 count mean sd min max 
Adopted 2667 51% 0.50 0 1 
GDP per Capita 2667 7,117 9,231 1,060 178,917 
Population 2667 28,973 148,131 816 6,038,714 
Non COSIP Revenue (Th) 2667 18,400 121,000 1,625 5,120,000 
Budget Position 2667 99.04 4.05 76.29 122.98 
Public Lighting in 2000  2629 67.51 21.86 1.83 100.00 
Urban Land Area 2628 3.57 18.03 0.01 557.38 
Muni Geographic Area 2667 1,485 5,112 3.57 107,603 
Liberal Party Mayor 2667 0.38 0.38 0 1 
Left Party Mayor 2667 0.08 0.21 0 1 
Opposition % 2638 45.80 18.88 0 100.00 
Neighborhood Adoption Pct 2667 31.41 22.74 0 92.86 
See Table 4.3 for a description of units.   







Variable Descriptions and Units 
Variable Units Units in Models 
Adoption Proportion Yes/No 
Years to Adoption Years 
GDP per Capita R$ 2010 Log R$ 2010 
Population People Log People 
Non COSIP Revenue R$ 2010 (Th) Log R$ 2010 
Budget Position Spending as Percent of Receipts 
Public Lighting in 2000 Proportion of Homes with Public Lighting 
Urban Land Area Km2 Log Km2 
Muni Geographic Area Km2 Log Km2 
Liberal Party Mayor 1 if Mayor from PSDB, PFL/DEM, PSL, PP, PSD 
PT Party Mayor 1 if Mayor from PT 
Left Party Mayor 1 if Mayor from PT,PSB,PCdoB 
Mayor Education Years NA 
Mayor Age Years NA 
Opposition Pct in Legislature Percent 
Neighborhood Adoption Pct Percent 





Probability of Adoption of COSIP Lighting Tax 
 Marginal Effects  Logit Coefficients 
 (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
GDP per Capita 0.038* -0.036   0.152* -0.147 
 (0.022) (0.051)   (0.087) (0.203) 
Population 0.228*** 0.275***   0.912*** 1.107*** 
 (0.037) (0.056)   (0.149) (0.227) 
Non COSIP Revenue -0.216*** -0.269***   -0.863*** -1.081*** 
 (0.044) (0.070)   (0.176) (0.282) 
Prior Budget Position -0.003 0.005   -0.012 0.020 
 (0.003) (0.004)   (0.011) (0.016) 
Public Lighting in 2000  0.000 0.003***   0.001 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.004) 
Urban Land Area 0.007 0.001   0.026 0.005 
 (0.015) (0.020)   (0.060) (0.082) 
Muni Geographic Area 0.017* 0.042*   0.066* 0.168* 
 (0.009) (0.024)   (0.036) (0.095) 
Liberal Party Mayor -0.077*** -0.002   -0.308*** -0.006 
 (0.028) (0.038)   (0.113) (0.154) 
Left Party Mayor 0.053 0.050   0.212 0.202 
 (0.051) (0.071)   (0.206) (0.284) 
Opposition % -0.002*** -0.003***   -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.003) 
Neighborhood Adoption Pct 0.004*** 0.006   0.017*** 0.025 
 (0.000) (0.007)   (0.002) (0.029) 
Constant     4.449** 4.144 
     (1.800) (2.989) 
N 2600 2134   2600 2134 
Microregion FEs No Yes   No Yes 
The dependent variable is adoption of COSIP Light tax. Values in parentheses are standard errors. Marginal Effects 
and Logit Coefficients are given for both model (1) and model (2), which is identical to model (1) except it adds 
microregion fixed effects. Logged variables include gdp per capita, population, non cosip revenues and km2 of 
municipality.  Marginal Effects are taken at the averages of the logged variables. 
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